

**Explaining Immigrants' Political Participation: An Identity Politics Approach Using
Evidence from Switzerland**

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PRELIMINARY – DO NOT CITE

Over the last several decades, the growth of ethnic and cultural diversity in many developed democracies has prompted vigorous debates about the integration of minorities. Many allege that immigrant minorities have failed to integrate—threatening the fabric of Europe's democracies. Indeed, the perceived 'failure' of immigrants' civic integration in many states has empowered radical right movements across Europe and engendered vigorous debates on the meaning of European citizenship and identity.

The reality of immigrants' civic integration, however, is far more nuanced than many accounts suggest. While a number of studies find that immigrants participate in politics at a lower average rate than natives across many European countries, patterns of participation vary dramatically across countries, subnational units, and even within immigrant groups (de Rooij 2012 ; Aleksynska 2011). These findings lead to an important question: what social and political factors drive differences in the political integration of immigrant minorities? Throughout this proposal, I employ the term "immigrant" to denote individuals that were born in a country other than their current country of residence (first-generation immigrants).

In light of recent immigration trends, scholars have advanced many different explanations of immigrant political participation patterns. In particular, many scholars argue that immigrants are most likely to participate in conventional activities such as voting when they are relatively educated, possess relatively high incomes, participate in civic organizations, and are mobilized by mainstream political parties. Others argue that immigrants may be especially likely to protest when they lack trust in existing institutions or perceive that they lack the resources necessary to gain influence through conventional channels (Heath et al. 2013, Dancygier 2010). Finally, many political science and sociology scholars also emphasize that states' divergent "models" of national identity and citizenship shape immigrants' patterns of political and social integration

(Brubaker 1992, Ireland 1994). An increasing number of empirical tests, however, suggest that a significant amount of variation in political participation across immigrants remains unexplained even upon accounting these socioeconomic and contextual factors (Gonzalez Ferrer 2011, Ireland 1994, Koopmans et al. 2005).

While many scholars have sought to gauge whether states' conceptions of identity and citizenship influence immigrants' political integration in Europe, few extant works consider the potential role of *immigrants'* collective identities and perceptions of their relative social position. In my dissertation, I suggest that these factors may represent an important—and relatively unexplored— source of variation in immigrants' political integration. Specifically, I argue that, under certain circumstances, perceptions of collective identity can influence both immigrants' motivations to engage politically and their capacity to do so. Such perceptions may have a direct impact on individuals' political engagement that may not be fully captured by previous studies emphasizing citizenship models and immigrants' individual demographic and socioeconomic characteristics.

My dissertation advances two principal arguments which will be explained in greater detail in subsequent sections. First, drawing from the U.S. ethnic politics literature, I argue that perceptions of linked fate with other members of their social groups enhance immigrants' capacity for political engagement in host country politics (Dawson 1994, Bobo and Gilliam 1990). Extending the definition of linked fate from American politics, I define linked fate as the degree to which individuals perceive that they will be personally affected by political developments—either in their origin countries or host countries—concerning their social, ethnic, or religious groups. Second, I argue that immigrants may be motivated to engage politically when they perceive relative deprivation) on the basis of their shared, collective ethnic, religious, or immigrant identities. Considered individually, I expect that both linked fate and relative deprivation will have a positive correlation with immigrants' political participation. I expect that immigrants perceiving both linked fate and relative deprivation will be significantly more likely to engage in host country politics than others. Such immigrants may possess both the motivation and a relatively high capacity for political engagement.

To test these hypotheses, I implemented an individual-level survey of 613 first-generation immigrants in Switzerland. Specifically, I surveyed immigrants from Turkey in three Swiss cantons which differ substantially in terms of citizenship policies and political opportunities afforded to immigrants. This design will allow me to assess whether or not my hypotheses hold across groups and across regions with diverse citizenship models. For simplicity, my survey will focus on three key dimensions of identity: ethnic identity, religious identity, and broad identification with other immigrants.

It is important to note that I am interested in gauging how individuals' perceptions of "linked fate" and relative deprivation influence their individual political participation. I assume that such perceptions are influenced by a complex set of factors including individual psychology, historical group and intergroup dynamics, and national and local-level integration policies. The purpose of this project, however, is not to describe or gauge how identities are formed and politicized, but rather to demonstrate when and how individual social psychological processes shape individuals' civic integration. My dissertation will be among the first comparative studies of the sociopsychological drivers of immigrant political participation.

I. Background and Theory

To begin, extant evidence from Europe suggests that immigrants' degree of political mobilization—both electoral and non-electoral— vary significantly across contexts and across origin groups. Looking across borders, recent studies suggest that immigrant citizens vote at rates comparable to natives in the U.K. and Germany but at lower rates in Denmark, Norway, and parts of Switzerland, among other places (Heath et al 2013, Gonzalez Ferrer 2011, Togeby 1999). Similarly, protest behavior is more common in France than in Switzerland and Germany (Ireland 1994, Giugni and Passy 2004, Koopmans et al 2005). At the local level, Maxwell, Togeby, Michon, Tillie and others have noted that immigrants of different origins participate at different rates in London, Paris, Copenhagen, and Amsterdam, respectively (2013 ; 1999 ; 2011). Diversity in immigrants' political participation begs an important question—when are immigrants most likely to integrate into the politics of their host countries?

Scholars have proposed a multitude of explanations for immigrants' participation patterns. First, many scholars posit that immigrants' mobilization is a function of their socioeconomic characteristics. With respect to electoral participation, proponents of this class of theories (known as SES) argue that immigrants' relative lack of education, lower income, and weak language skills and civic knowledge militate against voting. Immigrant's weak socioeconomic status is also often linked to protest participation. Dancygier, for example, suggests that immigrants possessing limited resources may protest insofar as they believe that their socioeconomic status limits their electoral clout (Dancygier 2010).

While SES theories have garnered substantial support in the U.S. context—particularly with respect to voter turnout—results from Europe suggest that SES theories may not explain much variance in immigrants' participation. In particular, recent results suggest that variation in participation does not simply reflect differences in immigrants' socioeconomic characteristics across distinct locales. Gonzalez-Ferrer, for example, finds that Turks are more likely to vote in Scandinavia than in Zürich even upon controlling for income and educational differences (Gonzalez Ferrer 2011). Likewise, Heath and al. find little evidence that income and educational differences among immigrants in the U.K. affect their electoral participation (Heath et al. 2013).

Further, many migration scholars argue that immigrant-origin minorities may be especially likely to make political claims in polities where citizenship laws and institutions affirm their “membership” and legitimacy as political actors. This approach, known as the “political opportunity structure” approach, posits that polities' divergent models of membership and citizenship ultimately govern minorities' social and political integration (Brubaker 1992, Ireland 1994, Koopmans et al 2005, Martiniello Statham 1999). On the Swiss subnational level, see Manatschal 2013.

Even upon accounting for “political opportunity structures” and socioeconomic differences, however, it is difficult to fully explain patterns in immigrants' political participation. Indeed, a number of studies suggest that participation rates vary across distinct immigrant groups embedded within the same institutional contexts, suggesting that both group-level and state-level factors may influence civic integration. Fennema and Tillie, for example, argue that Turks

residing in Amsterdam are more likely to participate in electoral politics than Moroccan, Surinamese, and Antillean immigrants due to their stronger ethnic organizational networks (Fennema Tillie 1999). Further, although some studies suggest that immigrant citizens are more engaged than non-citizens in general, immigrant citizens' participation varies significantly across contexts and origin groups (GonzalezFerrer 2011).

A number of scholars have also argued that immigrant groups' political incorporation is catalyzed by direct party outreach. Erie, for example, argues that party machines along the Eastern Seaboard catalyzed participation among Irish immigrants in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Erie 1988). Recent studies, however, cast doubt that party mobilization drives immigrants' participation patterns in modern-day Europe. Indeed, many scholars allege that mainstream parties have ignored immigrants in some context, notably the U.K. and Switzerland (Heath et al. 2013, Ireland 1994).

Broadly speaking, extant theories stop short of explaining much of the variation in immigrants' political incorporation. As such, a number of scholars have called for a "paradigm shift" in integration research. Bousetta, for example, argues that researchers should pay greater attention to how immigrant identities are formed and mobilized by immigrants' interactions with other immigrants as well as the state (Bousetta 2000). Similarly, a number of scholars have argued that immigrant minorities' political behavior is conditioned by communal solidarity and exposure to discrimination (Saggar 2000, Heath et al. 2013, Fieldhouse and Cutts 2008). An increasing number of scholars hold that migrants' identity perceptions may underscore patterns of political participation across contexts and across groups.

To date, few scholars have proposed cogent theories explaining if, when, and how immigrants' individual perceptions of collective identities influence their civic integration—particularly in the European context. A notable exception, Heath et al. find that immigrants' sense of group-level deprivation shapes their voting preferences in the U.K. (Heath et al. 2013). To date, however, very little work explores the degree to which psychological factors such as group relative deprivation, group consciousness, and linked fate may influence the magnitude and nature of immigrants' political engagement.

II. Theory

My dissertation advances and tests a theory of immigrant political participation that draws heavily from the work of African-American politics scholars such as Michael Dawson (1994) and Mills et al. (1981). Fundamentally, I argue that group identities are likely to influence immigrants' political participation insofar as they shape immigrants' motivations and capacity to engage their host societies. More specifically, I argue that immigrants that perceive that their ethnic, religious, or immigrant identities condition their social status in their host societies—and that perceive linked fate with other members of their social groups—may be particularly likely to engage in politics regardless of their individual demographic characteristics or the integration context in which they reside (please see my research design for an operational definition of political participation).

In order for collective identities to ultimately take on political relevance, immigrants must perceive, first and foremost, that they are members of a specific social group, be it ethnic, religious, or based on immigration status. Membership in this group must be immutable or difficult to change given individuals' short term resource endowments. That is, individuals perceive that they cannot easily change their group membership. It is important to note that these group identities need not be immigrants' primary identities nor must immigrants perceive strong attachment to them. Immigrants must simply consider themselves a member of a specific group.

a. Linked Fate

First, all else equal, immigrants may be relatively likely to participate in politics when they possess a sense of linked fate with other members of their social groups. Fundamentally, I argue that immigrants' linked fate enhances their sense of internal political efficacy and heightens their susceptibility to political mobilization by other group members—strengthening their capacity to engage.

Expanding racially-based definitions from U.S. politics, I define linked fate—as applied to immigrants—as the degree to which immigrants perceive that they will be personally affected by political developments concerning their social, ethnic, or religious groups or the immigrant community as a whole. Linked fate refers an individual's perceived political, rather than affective, attachment to his or her identity group(s). That is, "linked fate" is not simply empathy towards members of your own group, but rather a sense that political events that shape the welfare or rights of other members of your social group - even members you do not know personally - also affect your welfare or rights.

Extending earlier notions of linked fate that pertain largely to autochthonous minorities such as African-Americans, I argue that immigrants may possess ethnic or religious linked fate deriving either from their host-country experiences or their home-country experiences. Kurdish immigrants or indigenous Mexican immigrants, for example, may possess perceptions of linked fate forced by experiences as minorities in their home countries or their adoptive countries. In my survey, I will correspondingly gauge the degree to which immigrants in Switzerland perceive linked fate with members of the same ethnic and religious groups in their cantons of residence, with the immigrant community as a whole, and with co-ethnics in their countries of origin.

I argue that immigrant linked fate in any of these forms may affect political participation through two channels. First, and consistent with Shingles's accounts of African-Americans, linked fate may enhance immigrants' perceived internal efficacy (individuals' confidence in their ability to understand politics and act politically) (Shingles 1981). Put simply, "linked fate" sentiments may drive immigrants to engage with immigrant or religious groups. When an individual perceives that he or she will be affected by political events affecting his or her group, that immigrant may have strong incentives to strengthen ties with immigrant organizations and other immigrants interested in politics, formally and informally. Such interactions may enhance immigrants' confidence that they understand how to effectively participate in host-country politics.

Second, linked fate may facilitate immigrants' mobilization by community leaders. Put simply, individuals who perceive "linked fate" may be particularly likely to join and participate

regularly in formal or informal ethnic-, religious, or immigrant-interest associations—depending on the dimension along which linked fate is perceived— or to frequent venues where group interests are discussed and debated. Such immigrants thus become susceptible to political mobilization by their peers or by community organization leaders.

Continuing, I should stress that the most politically relevant variations of linked fate in Europe will likely differ substantially from the racially- and ethnically-based variant frequently discussed in the American context. More specifically, sentiments of linked fate developed in immigrants' origin countries may profoundly impact their host-country political behavior. Increasingly, many immigrant groups in Europe belong to minority groups in their own countries (e.g. Kurds and Christian groups from Turkey, Iraq, and Syria ; Berbers from Morocco and Algeria). I argue that many such individuals perceive linked fate with co-ethnics and co-religionists in their homelands. Upon immigrating to Europe, such groups often organize in order to support co-ethnics or co-religionists at home and spread awareness of homeland politics in the host country. In effect, linked fate forged in immigrants' homelands spurs the political mobilization of migrants in their host countries. Mobilization fosters political networks that strengthen and reinforce such migrants' minority identities. They also facilitate community leaders' mobilization of other group members and strengthen migrants' understanding of host country politics.

Conversely, perceptions of ethnic and religious linked fate, and linked fate with other immigrants, may manifest themselves infrequently in many European countries. In order for linked fate perceptions to emerge, immigrants must perceive that their status as an ethnic, religious, or other minority may negatively affect their life chances immediately or in the long run. Although some immigrants in some contexts may meet these criteria, others may be slow to develop linked fate if they plan to eventually return home, if they are more concerned with their relative standing in their homelands or within immigrant communities than in their host society more broadly, or if they believe that their life chances are governed by individual characteristics and capabilities rather than collective identities. In my survey, then, I plan to include questions gauging immigrants' perceptions of linked fate both in their homelands and host societies.

I concede that linked fate perceptions are likely, to a degree, endogenous to immigrants' pre-existing levels of organizational involvement and the integration contexts in which immigrants reside. To account for this possibility, in my analyses I will control for respondents' canton of residence and their degree of involvement in ethnic, religious, and immigrant organizations. I expect, however, that linked fate perceptions are cumulatively shaped by immigrants' historical interactions with other immigrants, with host country natives, with home country agents, and with host country political parties and citizenship institutions (Barth 1969, Favell 1998, Kastoryano 2002). As such, I expect linked fate to have a statistical effect on political participation that goes beyond those of integration context and pre-existing involvement in social organizations.

b. Relative Deprivation

Next, collective identities will provide motivations for political engagement when immigrants perceive that their group memberships condition their access to rights accorded to host country citizens. Immigrants must be aware of the rights possessed by host country citizens, must believe themselves to be entitled to these rights, and must perceive that their lack of access to such rights affects their personal well-being. They may perceive such relative deprivation) in one or several dimensions. For example, individuals may perceive that their group memberships limit their access to electoral politics and political participation. Individuals may also perceive that their group membership limits their right to cultural expression relative to other social groups (e.g., bans on headscarves or zoning restrictions for Muslim cemeteries may induce relative deprivation). Finally, individuals may perceive that their group membership limits their relative access to welfare or social benefits. Finally, individuals may perceive that their group membership limits their right to seek employment without facing discrimination.

c. Interaction Effect

Statistically speaking, I expect that "linked fate" and relative deprivation will have an interactive effect on political participation. I expect that "linked fate" alters capacity for motivation while relative deprivation shapes motivations for participation. If an immigrant has

relatively high "linked fate" but is unmotivated to participate, then he or she may ultimately not participate much. Conversely, if an immigrant has low "linked fate" and a low capacity to participate but possesses high relative deprivation, he or she may lack the ability to participate - even if he/she wishes to.

d. Hypotheses

I expect that immigrants' perceptions of linked fate and relative deprivation) will be positively correlated with political participation. Immigrants perceiving both linked fate and relative deprivation on the basis of shared identities may be especially likely to engage in host-country politics. Such immigrants are likely to possess both the capacity and motivation to participate politically.

III. Case Selection

Switzerland presents an ideal context for testing my hypotheses. Each of Switzerland's cantons has distinct political institutions and possesses significant latitude to establish and implement integration policies. Switzerland's high degree of subnational variation will thus enable me to study immigrants' engagement across contexts while avoiding some of the problems inherent in cross-national studies. Immigrant groups often differ widely across countries, with respect to both their national origins and their historical relationships with host societies. Furthermore, political institutions vary significantly across national contexts, potentially shaping immigrants' incentives to participate as well as politicians' incentives to mobilize them. Switzerland's federal system will enable me to study immigrant political mobilization in distinct integration contexts while holding immigrants' characteristics, federal political institutions, admission standards, and party systems roughly constant. This design will thus mitigate bias that might arise should the characteristics of party systems, parties' platforms, or electoral systems, or unobserved differences between immigrant groups influenced immigrants' individual propensity to participate.

Furthermore, naturalization is administered at the cantonal level. In order to achieve long-term residence permits and, ultimately, naturalize, immigrants must reside in a canton for a fixed period of time. As a result, relatively few immigrants move within Switzerland prior to naturalization. Language barriers also militate against cross-canton migration. This limits bias that might otherwise arise if immigrants could self-select into cantons with relatively liberal integration policies.

I have chosen to conduct my survey in the cantons of Neuchatel, Aargau, and Bern. Neuchatel is among Switzerland's most open cantons and possesses integration policies that are roughly similar to those of Scandinavia and, historically, of The Netherlands. Aargau, on the other hand, possess integration models that roughly approximate that of modern Germany. Bern possesses a mix of open and closed policies. As such, a focused comparison of immigrants' political engagement in these three cantons will provide how integration contexts may influence immigrants' civic integration in other major European societies.

Neuchatel offers immigrants the most extensive political rights in Switzerland. There, non-citizens who possess a second-stage residence permit can vote in local and cantonal elections, run for local office, and propose referenda. Furthermore, Neuchatel possesses a consultative commission through which elected immigrant community representatives can make recommendations to the cantonal parliament. Aargau, on the other hand, offers immigrants relatively limited political rights. Like Germany, Aargau does not allow non-citizens to vote or hold office and possess relatively few consultative bodies open to immigrant participation. Bern is an intermediate case—immigrants do not possess formal political rights at the moment but there is active debate over extending the franchise.

In the domain of citizenship policy, Neuchatel's naturalization procedures are relatively inclusive. No written citizenship examination is implemented—only a 20 minute oral interview designed to gauge oral French proficiency. Compared to many other cantons, Neuchatel requires only basic proficiency. In contrast, like Germany, Bern and Aargau require that would-be citizens pass written and oral citizenship tests that require a relatively high degree of language

proficiency. Citizenship fees also vary across cantons—they are highest in Aargau, followed by Bern, and finally Neuchatel.

The cantons of Aargau, Bern, and Neuchatel thus possess substantially different political opportunity structures and citizenship policies. As such, the Swiss case presents an opportunity to test my hypothesis in a variety of integration contexts, allowing me to estimate the degree to which sociopsychological factors affect individuals' political engagement, notwithstanding contextual differences. Essentially, testing my hypotheses across diverse set of contexts will enable me to gauge the degree to which my results may be generalizable across policy contexts.

I am focusing on Italians and migrants from Turkey for several reasons. First, I speak both Italian and Turkish. Second, both Italians and migrants from Turkey have a long history of immigration to Switzerland. These groups are spread out throughout Swiss cantons and significant populations exist in each of the cantons I have chosen. Third, based on 24 interviews and 4 focus groups conducted in 2015, I expect Kurds to possess a higher degree of linked fate, on average, than Turks, and Turks to have a higher degree of linked fate than Italians. Further, the inclusion of Kurds in my sample will enable me to gauge the degree to which linked fate with Kurds in Turkey affects engagement in Swiss politics. As such, I expect that surveying Turkish- and Italian-born immigrants will provide me with a diverse array of values for my variables of interest.

IV. Survey Methodology

From February 8 to June 3, 2016, I conducted a survey of 613 first-generation immigrants born in Turkey and Italy residing in 3 Swiss cantons: Aargau, Bern, and Neuchâtel. 313 respondents were born in Turkey and 300 in Italy (Table 1). The survey was administered by a professional polling firm in close collaboration with the PI. To participate in the survey, individuals were required to have been born in Italy or Turkey and to be over 18 years of age. The sample from Turkey included both Turkish and Kurdish respondents of Sunni Muslim or Alevi belief (as well as a small number of Yezidis and Turks of Greek descent). The survey was professionally translated into Italian, Turkish, French, and German and reviewed by native

speakers. Respondents could choose any of these languages to take the survey and could also choose to take the survey via a face-to-face interview, online, or a pen and paper questionnaire. The majority of surveys were conducted via face-to-face interviews in immigrants' native languages (See Tables 2 and 3) by a team of interviewers consisting of four professionally-trained interviewers (two in Turkish, two in Italian) and 11 student interviewers hired on a competitive basis from Swiss universities and trained by the PI. In addition, I conducted 35 interviews personally—33 of which were in Italian. All the Turkish-speaking interviewers were native-speakers born in Turkey. All but two of these interviewers were also bilingual in German or French and several were capable of explaining the interview questions in several Kurdish dialects. All but two of the Italian interviewers were native speakers and all were bilingual in either German or French. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with the assistance of tablets using built-in-filters, minimizing human error and discrepancies across interviewers. Interviews lasted between 15 and 30 minutes.

The use of tablets also facilitated the randomization of question blocks. By randomizing the order of questions, we can minimize bias that might arise should answers to identity questions influence responses to linked fate and relative deprivation questions and vice versa, or should relative deprivation questions bias responses to linked fate questions.

Table 1

Language of the Interviewplace	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Italian	300	48.94	48.94
Turkish	313	51.06	100.00
Total	613	100.00	

Table 2

Interview done	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
tablet	511	83.36	83.36
online	17	2.77	86.13
paper & pencil	85	13.87	100.00
Total	613	100.00	

Table 3

language	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
German	10	1.63	1.63
Italian	295	48.12	49.76
Turkish	308	50.24	100.00

Prior to the survey, the PI conducted 25 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with Italian and Turkish community leaders and immigration officials in 7 Swiss cantons in order to better understand the Swiss context and determine the content of the survey. These interviews were conducted in Spring and Fall 2015. Furthermore, in November 2015 the PI led four focus groups—2 comprised of first-generation Italian migrants and 2 comprised of first-generation migrants from Turkey—in the cantons of Bern and Neuchâtel. In total, these focus groups consisted of about 30 individuals. These focus groups provided an important venue for testing survey question drafts, checking respondents’ understanding of questions, and soliciting feedback on wording. Upon designing the final survey, the PI pre-tested the survey among several native German and Turkish speakers. Furthermore, a “pilot day” was held on March 3rd in Bern at a small number of Turkish and Italian venues. After the pilot day,

The survey was conducted through venue- and event-based sampling. The PI and his assistants secured permission at a large number of venues prior to sampling. Permission was sought at approximately 92 venues and events. We received permission from 84 venues and were explicitly denied permission by approximately 8 (including several restaurants, two small Turkish markets, two events sanctioned by the Turkish government, and a continuing education center for elderly immigrants), although several others never responded to e-mail and phone requests. A number of Turkish and Kurdish venues asked to review the survey in advance and some of these venues returned completed written surveys to the PI prior to sampling events

(about 5 to 6 total surveys were collected in this manner). Ultimately, surveys were conducted at 68 unique venues spread out across 14 municipalities in 3 cantons. These venues were chosen non-randomly on the basis of practicality, interviewers' schedules, and the ease of reaching the target populations with diverse political dispositions. They included many restaurants, bars, markets, events sponsored by cultural associations, the Italian Embassy and several Embassy-sponsored events, and events at several places of worship (4 mosques, 3 Alevi cemevleri, and 6 Italian Catholic Missions) (see Appendix 1 for a list of venues). On average, 9 surveys were conducted per venue. Given the high degree of sensitivity of identity politics among Turkish-born populations, I made an effort to send interviewers of Kurdish origin to Kurdish venues, Sunni Muslim interviewers to Sunni venues, and Alevi interviewers to Alevi venues whenever possible. Additionally, to minimize bias based on gender, all interviews with Sunni Muslim women were conducted by female interviewers. Insofar as possible, I chose venues whose nature is unlikely to correlate with attendees' degree of interest in and participation in Swiss politics—avoiding sampling at explicitly political organizations insofar as possible.

At each venue, interviewers randomly approached potential respondents and requested their participation in the survey. Interviewers first asked individuals if they would be willing to participate in a face-to-face interview. If the respondent was interested but did not have time, the interviewers distributed paper surveys with self-addressed stamped envelopes or cards with a link to take the survey online. In some cases, also, venue leaders requested that we distribute paper surveys instead of conducting face-to-face interviews. The pilot phase of the survey suggested that online and mail-in paper survey response rates would be extremely low (less than 10 percent) and thus we decided to emphasize face-to-face surveying when possible. Often, community leaders or venue owners introduced the survey and the research team. Sometimes, I was invited to introduce myself and briefly discuss my research. These factors contributed to an ultimate response rate of approximately 54 percent.

a) Descriptive Statistics

In total, we conducted 613 surveys across the cantons of Aargau, Bern, and Neuchâtel. Thirty percent of surveys were conducted in Bern (181), 32 percent in Neuchâtel (196), and 38 percent in Aargau (236). In total, 313 respondents were born in Turkey and 300 born in Italy. On average, 35 percent of the sample consisted of women. The average age of the sample was 53.7

years old. Respondents, on average, completed about 10 years of schooling (partial completion of high school). About 8 percent of the sample was unemployed and seeking employment (see Table 4). About 44 percent of respondents identified as Catholic, 26 percent as Sunni Muslim, and 14 percent as Alevi.

Table 4

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
age	609	53.73563	16.05636	18	95
BERN	613	.2952692	.4565362	0	1
NEUCHATEL	613	.319739	.4667562	0	1
AARGAU	613	.3849918	.4869908	0	1
born_italy	613	.4893964	.5002958	0	1
born_turkey	613	.5106036	.5002958	0	1
kurd	613	.1647635	.3712699	0	1
turk	613	.2137031	.4102544	0	1
muslim_sunni	613	.2561175	.4368439	0	1
alevi	613	.137031	.3441609	0	1
catholic	613	.4437194	.4972281	0	1
unemp	613	.0750408	.2636723	0	1
female	613	.3458401	.4760298	0	1
educ_attain	601	10.21048	4.804273	0	35

In the Italian sample, approximately 37 percent of respondents were female. Ninety-one percent of those surveyed identified as Roman Catholic. 22 identified as non-religious, agnostic, or atheist. On average, respondents were 63 years old and possessed 10 years of education. Approximately 3 percent of the Italian sample was unemployed and seeking employment. About 54 percent of Italians sampled were retired (see Table 5). Anecdotal evidence suggests that Italians sampled were from many different regions of Italy, but the far South (Sicily, Abruzzo) and the far north (Lombardy) are particularly well-represented.

Of the Turkish-born sample, 32 percent were female. Thirty-two percent identified only as Kurdish and 42 percent identified uniquely as Turkish, with the remainder identifying as both, neither, or abstaining from response. About 50 percent of the Turkish-born sample identified as Sunni Muslim and 27 percent identified as Alevi. 58 respondents saw themselves as non-religious, agnostic, or atheist. On average, respondents were 44 years old and possessed 10 years of education. Almost 12 percent were unemployed and seeking employment, and about 1 percent

were retired (See Table 5). Anecdotal evidence suggests that the bulk of Turkish-born migrants in the sample originated in the Turkish cities of Kahramanmaraş, Tunceli/Dersim, Bayburt, Antalya, and Çorum.

Table 5

-> langbefr = Italian

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
age	298	63.01007	15.62362	18	95
BERN	300	.3133333	.4646237	0	1
NEUCHATEL	300	.3466667	.4767037	0	1
AARGAU	300	.34	.4745003	0	1
born_italy	300	1	0	1	1
born_turkey	300	0	0	0	0
kurd	300	0	0	0	0
turk	300	0	0	0	0
muslim_sunni	300	0	0	0	0
alevi	300	0	0	0	0
catholic	300	.9066667	.291385	0	1
unemp	300	.03	.1708722	0	1
female	300	.3733333	.4844977	0	1
educ_attain	288	10.11806	5.088754	0	35
retirement	286	.5384615	.4993923	0	1

-> langbefr = Turkish

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
age	311	44.84887	10.4813	20	81
BERN	313	.2779553	.4487086	0	1
NEUCHATEL	313	.2939297	.4562896	0	1
AARGAU	313	.428115	.4955979	0	1
born_italy	313	0	0	0	0
born_turkey	313	1	0	1	1
kurd	313	.3226837	.4682515	0	1
turk	313	.4185304	.494108	0	1
muslim_sunni	313	.5015974	.5007981	0	1
alevi	313	.2683706	.4438211	0	1
catholic	313	0	0	0	0
unemp	313	.1182109	.3233746	0	1
female	313	.3194888	.4670252	0	1
educ_attain	313	10.29553	4.533322	0	24
retirement	302	.0099338	.0993366	0	1

Given that Italian migration largely preceded Turkish migration to Switzerland, and given that some Italian respondents migrated during or immediately after World War II, the difference in age and employment status likely reflects underlying population values.

Looking across cantons, the average age and educational attainment of respondents were roughly the same in Aargau, Bern, and Neuchâtel. The female proportion of the sample, however, varies substantially across cantons. In Bern, women comprised 26 percent of the sample. In Aargau and Neuchâtel, women comprised 42 percent and 34 percent, respectively.

The unemployed share of respondents also varied across cantons. In Bern and Aargau, these shares were 8 percent and 4 percent respectively. In Neuchâtel, the unemployed share was 11 percent, possibly reflecting the fact that many Italian interviews in that canton took place at Italian-government sanctioned events (and thus there may have been more people applying for benefits from the Italian government). See Table 6 for more information.

Table 6

-> ktbefr = BE					
Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
age	180	55.38333	15.62203	21	90
born_italy	181	.519337	.5010119	0	1
born_turkey	181	.480663	.5010119	0	1
kurd	181	.2707182	.4455634	0	1
turk	181	.0718232	.2589112	0	1
muslim_sunni	181	.0828729	.2764548	0	1
alevi	181	.1767956	.3825539	0	1
catholic	181	.4585635	.4996623	0	1
unemp	181	.0828729	.2764548	0	1
female	181	.2596685	.4396689	0	1
educ_attain	181	10.03039	4.71645	0	23
-> ktbefr = AG					
Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
age	234	51.40598	14.75384	18	87
born_italy	236	.4322034	.4964352	0	1
born_turkey	236	.5677966	.4964352	0	1
kurd	236	.059322	.2367285	0	1
turk	236	.3686441	.4834625	0	1
muslim_sunni	236	.4449153	.4980126	0	1
alevi	236	.0974576	.2972103	0	1
catholic	236	.3940678	.4896881	0	1
unemp	236	.0381356	.1919306	0	1
female	236	.4152542	.4938131	0	1
educ_attain	227	10.04405	4.159199	0	30
-> ktbefr = NE					
Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
age	195	55.01026	17.62554	20	95
born_italy	196	.5306122	.50034	0	1
born_turkey	196	.4693878	.50034	0	1
kurd	196	.1938776	.3963465	0	1
turk	196	.1581633	.3658285	0	1
muslim_sunni	196	.1887755	.3923323	0	1
alevi	196	.1479592	.3559688	0	1
catholic	196	.4897959	.501176	0	1
unemp	196	.1122449	.3164759	0	1
female	196	.3418367	.4755398	0	1
educ_attain	193	10.57513	5.542055	0	35

Looking at the Turkish-born population more specifically, several differences across cantons are worth noting. First, the proportions of Sunni Muslims and Alevis vary across cantons. In Bern, Sunni Muslims constituted only 17 percent of the sample while Alevis constituted 36 percent. The remainder of those surveyed in Bern largely answered “non-religious” or “agnostic/atheist.” In Aargau, on the other hand, Sunni Muslims constituted 78 percent of the sample and Alevis 17 percent. In Neuchâtel, Sunni Muslims comprised 40 percent of respondents and Alevis 32 percent. Furthermore, the proportion of respondents identifying as uniquely Kurdish or Turkish varied across cantons. In Bern, 56 percent of respondents identified as Kurdish and 15 percent as Turkish. In Aargau, 10 percent identified as Kurdish and 65 percent identified as Turkish. In Neuchâtel, 41 percent identified as Kurdish and 34 percent as Turkish. See Table 7 below for more information.

Table 7

-> ktbefr = BE

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
age	86	46.95349	10.86485	21	77
BERN	87	1	0	1	1
NEUCHATEL	87	0	0	0	0
AARGAU	87	0	0	0	0
born_italy	87	0	0	0	0
born_turkey	87	1	0	1	1
kurd	87	.5632184	.4988626	0	1
turk	87	.1494253	.3585739	0	1
muslim_sunni	87	.1724138	.3799295	0	1
alevi	87	.3678161	.4850064	0	1
catholic	87	0	0	0	0
unemp	87	.137931	.3468266	0	1
female	87	.2873563	.4551526	0	1
educ_attain	87	10.86782	5.138466	0	23
retirement	80	.0125	.1118034	0	1

-> ktbefr = AG

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
age	134	44.57463	10.05278	22	81
BERN	134	0	0	0	0
NEUCHATEL	134	0	0	0	0
AARGAU	134	1	0	1	1
born_italy	134	0	0	0	0
born_turkey	134	1	0	1	1
kurd	134	.1044776	.3070269	0	1
turk	134	.6492537	.4789943	0	1
muslim_sunni	134	.7835821	.4133476	0	1
alevi	134	.1716418	.3784837	0	1
catholic	134	0	0	0	0
unemp	134	.0597015	.237822	0	1
female	134	.4029851	.4923383	0	1
educ_attain	134	10.03731	3.85529	3	20
retirement	130	.0076923	.0877058	0	1

-> ktbefr = NE

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
age	91	43.26374	10.5207	20	68
BERN	92	0	0	0	0
NEUCHATEL	92	1	0	1	1
AARGAU	92	0	0	0	0
born_italy	92	0	0	0	0
born_turkey	92	1	0	1	1
kurd	92	.4130435	.4950785	0	1
turk	92	.3369565	.4752599	0	1
muslim_sunni	92	.4021739	.4930235	0	1
alevi	92	.3152174	.4671482	0	1
catholic	92	0	0	0	0
unemp	92	.1847826	.3902478	0	1
female	92	.2282609	.4220114	0	1
educ_attain	92	10.13043	4.831712	0	24
retirement	92	.0108696	.1042572	0	1

b) Preliminary Results

In the following sections, I will present the results from some initial regression analysis of the survey data. Please note that I received the (uncleaned) dataset approximately two weeks ago and have had insufficient time to thoroughly analyze the results. Overall, the initial results suggest that linked fate and relative deprivation may have an impact on political participation

upon accounting for socioeconomic factors, birth country, and integration context. Notably, Kurds who displayed evidence of linked fate with other Kurds in Turkey appear to have participated in Swiss politics more than others. Interestingly, the most powerful predictor of participation in Swiss politics appears to be participation in homeland politics.

To begin, I regressed an additive index of political participation on two measures of linked fate (in 2 separate OLS regressions) and a battery of control variables, including age, time spent in Switzerland, gender, educational attainment, unemployment, ethnicity, religion, and canton of residence. I calculated clustered standard errors, clustered at venues, to account for correlations in the error terms for respondents sampled at the same venue. The index of political participation, the key dependent variable, consists of the sum of all elements in Q1 below. It is important to note that I will likely test a variety of indexes in future iterations of this paper as well as run individual regressions for diverse types of political participation.

Q1) There are many different forms of political participation other than voting. Below, you will see a list of several common ways that people participate in Swiss politics. Please read the list and indicate which of these actions you have performed within the last 12 months. Please select as many as applicable:

- a) Sign a petition related to political issues in Switzerland*
- b) Boycott or deliberately purchase certain products for political, ethical, or environmental reasons*
- c) Volunteer for a political campaign or organization concerned with politics in Switzerland*
- d) Participate in a demonstration related to politics in Switzerland*
- e) Attended a public hearing or discussion related to a proposed policy (Vernehmlassung or Gemeindeversammlung)*
- f) Attended an informational meeting about a party, candidate, or proposed policy, or about opportunities for political participation*
- g) Contact or attempt to contact a Swiss politician or political party*
- h) Make a donation or raise money for a political activity related to Switzerland*

Table 8 below suggests a significant amount of diversity in the number of these items respondents have undertaken. As such, I expect regression analysis will provide meaningful insight into the factors that influence migrants' level of political engagement.

particip_ho st	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	278	45.35	45.35
1	144	23.49	68.84
2	79	12.89	81.73
3	38	6.20	87.93
4	25	4.08	92.01
5	13	2.12	94.13
6	15	2.45	96.57
7	15	2.45	99.02
8	6	0.98	100.00
Total	613	100.00	

The key measures of linked fate in this regression—the key independent variables—were measured through Q2 and Q3 below. Q2 was designed to capture the degree to which immigrants perceive that others share political orientations or beliefs based on their immigrant status alone, suggesting a politicization of collective immigrant identities. Q3 was designed to capture the degree to which the empowerment of other immigrants in Switzerland is reflected in individuals' personal level of optimism about their future. These questions diverge somewhat from American standard linked fate questions. I will discuss this divergence in more detail as this paper develops.

Q2) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

My personal interests would be better represented in the Swiss government if more immigrants were in office across Switzerland.

- a. Strongly agree*
- b. Somewhat agree*
- c. Neither agree nor disagree*
- d. Somewhat disagree*
- e. Strongly disagree*

f. *Don't know / Not sure.*

Q3) In 2015, Swiss citizens in Basel-Stadt elected an immigrant to the Nationalrat.

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

When immigrants assume positions of power in Switzerland, I feel more optimistic about my chances for a successful life here.

- a. *Strongly agree*
- b. *Somewhat agree*
- c. *Neither agree nor disagree*
- d. *Somewhat disagree*
- e. *Strongly disagree*
- f. *Don't know / Not sure.*

The results below are striking (Table 9). The results from regression (1) suggest that immigrants who agree with the statement in Q2 above may participate in Swiss politics at a greater rate than others even after controlling for birth country, integration context, and SES. These results are significant at a 95 percent level. Looking to regression (2), the correlation is similar, albeit slightly weaker, for those agreeing with Q3. This effect was significant at a 90 percent level. It is important to note, however, that not all respondents received this question and that this lower significance level may result from fewer observations in the second regression.

Looking at controls, the regressions also suggest that political participation rates may be influenced by education levels (both regressions), gender (regression 1), and citizenship status (regression 2). The results also suggest that, relative to Neuchatel, overall levels of participation may be low in Aargau, the canton with the most restricted political opportunity structures of the 3 sampled. These results are consistent with existing literatures on SES and on political opportunity structures. Finally, the results from regression 1 suggest (at a 90 percent confidence level) that Kurds participate more in Swiss politics, on average, than other respondents, and Sunni Muslims tend to participate at lower rates.

Table 9

VARIABLES	(1) est_3 particip_host	(2) est_4 particip_host
citizenship, Switzerland	0.391 (0.254)	0.648** (0.281)
years in Switzerland	-0.00139 (0.0104)	-0.0213 (0.0151)
better representation with more immigrants in office	0.155** (0.0650)	
Age	0.00550 (0.0104)	0.0191 (0.0156)
BERN	-0.871* (0.456)	-0.754 (0.569)
years of schooling	0.0609*** (0.0208)	0.0487** (0.0219)
AARGAU	-0.889** (0.391)	-0.827* (0.488)
Kurd	0.586* (0.315)	0.444 (0.472)
Turk	0.174 (0.346)	0.288 (0.466)
muslim_sunni	-0.559* (0.324)	-0.399 (0.403)
Unemp	0.236 (0.419)	-0.179 (0.406)
Female	-0.592*** (0.149)	-0.402 (0.252)
optimistic life chances with immigrants in powerful		0.128*

positions in Switzerland

		(0.0700)
Constant	0.616	0.460
	(0.699)	(0.886)
Observations	543	296
R-squared	0.171	0.156

c) Robust standard errors in parentheses

d) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Next, I ran another set of regressions replacing linked fate with an indicator of immigrant relative deprivation (*immig_rd*). Here, I regressed the additive index of political participation on immigrant relative deprivation and a battery of controls. I measured immigrant relative deprivation through the set of questions below. To minimize bias that might arise from question wording, each respondent was randomly assigned either the wording in Q4a or Q4b below. The questions were then combined into a unified scale.

Q4a) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

In Switzerland, immigrants, regardless of their origin, have fewer economic opportunities than most Swiss people.

- a. Strongly agree*
- b. Somewhat agree*
- c. Neither agree nor disagree*
- d. Somewhat disagree*
- e. Strongly disagree*
- f. Don't know / Not sure.*

Q4b) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

In Switzerland, immigrants, regardless of their origin, have the same economic opportunities as Swiss people.

- a. Strongly agree*
- b. Somewhat agree*
- c. Neither agree nor disagree*
- d. Somewhat disagree*
- e. Strongly disagree*
- f. Don't know / Not sure.*

The results are listed in Table 10 below. Regression 2 includes clustered standard errors while Regression 1 uses unadjusted standard errors. The effect of immigrant relative deprivation on participation is positive and significant at the 95 percent level in the first regression but the confidence level drops to 90 percent after instituting clustered standard errors. Taking into account the small sample size, these results suggest that immigrant relative deprivation may have a positive impact on political participation.

Turning to control variables, the results are largely consistent with the regressions above and with the existing literature on immigrant political participation. Both regressions suggest that education has a small but significant effect on political participation. Likewise, political participation seems to decrease as political opportunity structures grow more stringent. Furthermore, female immigrants appear to participate in politics less than male immigrants.

Table 10

VARIABLES	(1) particip_host	(2) particip_host
citizenship, Switzerland	0.425*** (0.164)	0.425 (0.255)
years in Switzerland	0.00293 (0.00860)	0.00293 (0.0105)

immig_rd	0.116**	0.116*
	(0.0519)	(0.0685)
Age	0.00604	0.00604
	(0.00913)	(0.0102)
BERN	-1.025***	-1.025**
	(0.204)	(0.415)
years of schooling	0.0779***	0.0779***
	(0.0188)	(0.0208)
AARGAU	-1.104***	-1.104***
	(0.200)	(0.363)
Kurd	0.449*	0.449
	(0.255)	(0.305)
Turk	0.149	0.149
	(0.276)	(0.325)
muslim_sunni	-0.642**	-0.642*
	(0.264)	(0.347)
Unemp	0.402	0.402
	(0.299)	(0.374)
Female	-0.557***	-0.557***
	(0.168)	(0.176)
Constant	0.649	0.649
	(0.553)	(0.670)
Observations	505	505
R-squared	0.199	0.199

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

I next ran two additional regressions. The first looks only at Kurds, regressing the political participation index on the same controls and an indicator of the degree to which Kurds experienced linked fate while living in Turkey (see question 5 below). The second regression

looks at the degree to which political participation at home correlates with political participation in Switzerland.

Q5) To what degree do you believe that Turkish policies concerning other Kurds in Turkey (for example, the construction of the Ilisu dam near Hasankeyf) affected your life personally WHEN YOU LIVED IN TURKEY?

Not at All 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely

This question was designed to gauge the degree to which individuals perceive developments affecting their group broadly affected them personally—a logic similar to standard American linked fate questions. Given that most Kurdish respondents grew up in areas distant from Hasankeyf, this question should effectively capture perceived political linkages between individual Kurds and Kurds as a collective.

The index of homeland political participation is similar to the index of political participation in Switzerland. It is an additive index of all elements in Q6 below.

Q6) Please read the list and indicate which of these actions you have performed within the last year. Select as many as applicable:

- a) Voted in [ITALY/TURKEY]’s last national election*
- b) Sign a petition related to political issues in [ITALY/TURKEY]*
- c) Participate in a demonstration related to politics in [ITALY/TURKEY]*
- d) Make a donation or raise money for a political activity related to [ITALY/TURKEY]*
- e) Volunteer for a political campaign or organization concerned with politics in [ITALY/TURKEY].*
- f) Attended an informational meeting about a candidate or proposed policy in [ITALY/TURKEY], or about opportunities for political participation there.*

The results, in Table 11 below, are striking once again. Controlling for demographic factors and canton of residence, the results suggest that individuals perceiving that they were personally affected by Turkish policies towards Kurds may be substantially more likely than

others to participate in Swiss politics. These effects are significant at a 95 percent confidence level and are larger than the effects of socioeconomic variables such as age, educational attainment, and unemployment status.

The results of regression 2 suggest, also, that homeland political participation is significantly and positively correlated with host country political participation. This effect is significant at a 99 percent confidence level and substantively has a greater impact on participation than SES, integration context, and even citizenship status.

Overall, these two results suggest that immigrants' political integration may be influenced more heavily by their political socialization and experiences at home than their host-country context. I plan to explore these results more substantially as I develop my dissertation.

Table 11

	(1)	(2)
	est_5	est_6
VARIABLES	particip_host	particip_host
citizenship, Switzerland	0.376 (0.403)	0.344** (0.143)
years in Switzerland	0.0304 (0.0320)	0.0107 (0.00746)
degree of personal impact of Turkish policies concerning other Kurds	0.255** (0.0958)	
Age	0.0397 (0.0322)	-0.000256 (0.00781)
BERN	-1.633** (0.653)	-0.615** (0.269)
years of schooling	0.116*** (0.0324)	0.0493*** (0.0138)
AARGAU	-1.921**	-0.537**

	(0.717)	(0.227)
muslim_sunni	-0.0588	-0.282*
	(0.388)	(0.168)
Unemp	0.510	0.323
	(0.504)	(0.283)
Female	-0.336	-0.434***
	(0.306)	(0.103)
particip_home		0.652***
		(0.0681)
Constant	-1.969	-0.0414
	(1.392)	(0.463)
Observations	135	592
R-squared	0.352	0.398

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In the subsequent section, I repeat the above regressions using “intention to naturalize” as the dependent variable (see Tables 12a, 12b, and 12c). The intention to naturalize was measured by Q7 below:

Q7) If you were eligible to apply for Swiss citizenship right now, would you?

- a) Yes*
- b) No*
- c) Not sure*
- d) Prefer not to respond.*

The results of these regressions were less revealing. Home country participation and Kurdish linked fate did not appear to influence respondents’ desire to naturalize. Similarly, relative deprivation had no statistically significant effect. Both measures of immigrant linked fate, however, had a small but positive impact on the intention to naturalize, albeit at a 90 percent

confidence level. These results suggest that linked fate may influence immigrants' political integration not only by inspiring political participation directly but also by influencing their naturalization decisions.

Table 12a

VARIABLES	(1) citz_intent	(2) citz_intent
years in Switzerland	-0.00531** (0.00207)	-0.00461* (0.00251)
better representation with more immigrants in office	0.0243* (0.0139)	
Age	-0.00161 (0.00196)	-0.00379 (0.00277)
BERN	0.0808 (0.0557)	0.107 (0.0665)
years of schooling	0.00468 (0.00551)	-0.000508 (0.00727)
AARGAU	0.0660 (0.0637)	0.103 (0.0654)
Kurd	0.0247 (0.0681)	-0.0257 (0.0758)
Turk	0.0122 (0.0899)	0.112 (0.0973)
muslim_sunni	0.0330 (0.113)	0.0127 (0.113)
Unemp	0.0769 (0.0694)	0.214* (0.113)
Female	-0.00737 (0.0384)	0.0247 (0.0576)

optimistic life chances with immigrants in powerful positions in Switzerland		0.0252*
		(0.0149)
Constant	0.320** (0.150)	0.400* (0.201)
Observations	543	296
R-squared	0.106	0.158

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 12b

	(1)	(2)
VARIABLES	citiz_intent	citiz_intent
years in Switzerland	-0.00532** (0.00217)	-0.00532** (0.00252)
immig_rd	0.0208 (0.0131)	0.0208 (0.0132)
Age	-0.00265 (0.00231)	-0.00265 (0.00204)
BERN	0.0694 (0.0514)	0.0694 (0.0517)
years of schooling	0.00419 (0.00473)	0.00419 (0.00580)
AARGAU	0.0196 (0.0506)	0.0196 (0.0604)
Kurd	0.000971 (0.0641)	0.000971 (0.0723)
Turk	-0.0147	-0.0147

	(0.0699)	(0.0923)
muslim_sunni	0.0130	0.0130
	(0.0669)	(0.114)
Unemp	0.108	0.108
	(0.0754)	(0.0799)
Female	0.0230	0.0230
	(0.0424)	(0.0385)
Constant	0.446***	0.446***
	(0.139)	(0.139)
Observations	505	505
R-squared	0.115	0.115

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 12c

	(1)	(2)
	est_10	est_11
VARIABLES	citiz_intent	citiz_intent
years in Switzerland	-0.0227***	-0.00403**
	(0.00469)	(0.00202)
degree of impairment by Turkish policies concerning other Kurds	0.0222	
	(0.0188)	
Age	-0.00550	-0.00360**
	(0.00475)	(0.00177)

BERN	0.158** (0.0727)	0.0995* (0.0540)
years of schooling	-0.0164** (0.00783)	0.00300 (0.00550)
AARGAU	0.256* (0.145)	0.0733 (0.0600)
muslim_sunni	0.0501 (0.119)	0.0327 (0.0757)
Unemp	0.0224 (0.0905)	0.120 (0.0731)
Female	-0.0723 (0.0805)	0.0101 (0.0365)
particip_home		0.0168 (0.0156)
Constant	0.987*** (0.234)	0.458*** (0.129)
Observations	135	592
R-squared	0.306	0.114

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Finally, I ran a last set of regressions using respondents' propensity to participate in demonstrations as a dependent variable (see Tables 13a, 13b, and 13c below). Again, both measurements of linked fate had a positive and significant impact on demonstration participation (Q2 was significant at the 95 percent level while Q3 was significant at the 90 percent level). Again, Kurdish linked fate (Q5) and homeland political participation (Q6) had substantively large and positive effects on demonstration participation. In this case, each of these effects was significant at the 99 percent level.

Notably, immigrant relative deprivation had a less ambiguous positive effect on demonstration participation than on the additive participation index. This effect also significant

at the 95 percent level upon calculating clustered standard errors (see Table 13b).

Table 13a

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)
	political participation Switzerland participation in a demonstration	political participation Switzerland participation in a demonstration
citizenship, Switzerland	0.00317 (0.0427)	0.0539 (0.0478)
years in Switzerland	-0.00359 (0.00250)	-0.00759** (0.00331)
better representation with more immigrants in office	0.0242** (0.0110)	
Age	0.00460* (0.00248)	0.00741** (0.00339)
BERN	-0.0361 (0.0896)	-0.0301 (0.112)
years of schooling	0.00323 (0.00439)	-0.00166 (0.00487)
AARGAU	-0.126 (0.0792)	-0.127 (0.0892)
Kurd	0.348*** (0.0633)	0.289*** (0.0790)
Turk	0.117 (0.0715)	0.123 (0.0838)
muslim_sunni	-0.140* (0.0707)	-0.0978 (0.0752)
Unemp	0.0942 (0.105)	0.00507 (0.124)

Female	-0.0722** (0.0298)	-0.0184 (0.0453)
optimistic life chances with immigrants in powerful positions in Switzerland		0.0326* (0.0168)
Constant	-8.91e-05 (0.133)	-0.0549 (0.172)
Observations	536	294
R-squared	0.196	0.175

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 13b

	(1)	(2)
	political participation Switzerland	political participation Switzerland
VARIABLES	participation in a demonstration	participation in a demonstration

citizenship, Switzerland	0.0353 (0.0357)	0.0353 (0.0419)
years in Switzerland	-0.00156 (0.00186)	-0.00156 (0.00186)
immig_rd	0.0307*** (0.0113)	0.0307** (0.0129)

Age	0.00410** (0.00197)	0.00410** (0.00188)
BERN	-0.103** (0.0441)	-0.103 (0.0795)
years of schooling	0.00630 (0.00407)	0.00630 (0.00441)
AARGAU	-0.190*** (0.0435)	-0.190*** (0.0717)
Kurd	0.339*** (0.0555)	0.339*** (0.0749)
Turk	0.0870 (0.0611)	0.0870 (0.0666)
muslim_sunni	-0.131** (0.0585)	-0.131* (0.0747)
Unemp	0.124* (0.0645)	0.124 (0.104)
Female	-0.0689* (0.0363)	-0.0689** (0.0320)
Constant	-0.0343 (0.120)	-0.0343 (0.136)
Observations	497	497
R-squared	0.225	0.225

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 13c

	(1)	(2)
	political participation	political participation
	Switzerland	Switzerland

VARIABLES	participation in a demonstration	participation in a demonstration
citizenship, Switzerland	-0.0798 (0.0864)	0.0148 (0.0324)
years in Switzerland	0.00254 (0.00678)	-0.00280 (0.00174)
degree of impairment by Turkish policies concerning other Kurds	0.0726*** (0.0201)	
Age	0.00627 (0.00666)	0.00266 (0.00193)
BERN	-0.129 (0.145)	0.000629 (0.0671)
years of schooling	0.00398 (0.00893)	-0.00182 (0.00383)
AARGAU	-0.225* (0.120)	-0.0891 (0.0575)
muslim_sunni	-0.0756 (0.0933)	-0.0854* (0.0429)
Unemp	0.168 (0.117)	0.158** (0.0775)
Female	0.00451 (0.0843)	-0.0635** (0.0311)
particip_home		0.114*** (0.0123)
Constant	-0.175 (0.311)	0.0610 (0.108)
Observations	133	583
R-squared	0.205	0.272

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

V. Conclusion

In this paper, I have presented very preliminary results of my survey in Switzerland. To test my hypotheses effectively, more thorough analysis is needed. That said, thus far these results suggest that linked fate and relative deprivation may have an important influence on immigrants' political participation—at least in the Swiss context. Furthermore, the results suggest that linked fate sentiments forged in immigrants' homelands, and, more broadly, immigrants' political socialization in their homelands, may have a substantial effect on their host country political integration—even after taking into account their demographic characteristics and the integration context in which they reside.

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Appendix 1: List of Survey Venues

- 1 Casa d`Italia
- 2 Missione Cattolica Italiana Bern
- 4 Furkan Metzgeri
- 5 Umut Market
- 6 Restaurant Lory
- 7 Tax Seminar Bern
- 9 Punto d`Incontro Wettingen
- 10 Circolo Abruzzese Suhr
- 11 Missione Cattolica Aarau
- 12 Missione Cattolica Neuchâtel
- 13 Associazione MODC Neuchâtel

14 Associazione MODC La CDF
15 COMITES Festa della Liberazione, Ber
17 Missione Cattolica Wettingen
18 Missione Cattolica Biel
19 Festa nel Bosco, Punto di Incontro,
21 Mother`s Day Festivities, Circolo Ab
22 Visit of new Italian Ambassador to S
23 Festa della Liberazione La CDF
24 Anatolian Cultural Center, Wohlen
28 May Day Political Meetings, La-Chaux
29 Parenting Seminar for Turkish immigr
31 Anatolian Kulturverein Grönichen
32 Alima
33 Dem-Kurd
34 Rami Market
36 Hunkar Ocakbasi
37 Mr. Durum
38 Dergah
40 Aarburg Yesil Camii
42 Yildiz Market
43 La Turquoise
44 La Rosiere
46 Wildcards Törken
47 KUTUSCH Informational Meeting
48 Wildcards Törken
49 Wildcards Törken
50 Wildcards Italien
52 Wildcards Italien
53 Wohlen Camii, Aargau
58 Doettigen Camii, Aargau
59 Alevi Cultural Center, Windisch

60 Alevi Cultural Center, Biel/Bienne
62 Neuchâtel Demokratik Guc Birligi Ral
65 Brasserie Terminus, La-Chaux-de-Fond
66 Neuchâtel Camii
67 Turkish Cafe / Cultural Center, Neuc
68 Au Paradis Kebab, La Chaux-de-Fonds
69 Bosphorus, La-CDF
70 Leo Pod, La-CDF
72 Italian Embassy, Switzerland
73 Associazione MODC Thun
76 CLI-Neuchâtel
77 Marche Adriatique
78 Brasserie L`Etoile
80 Citerama
81 Missione Cattolica Birm
82 ACLI Wohlen
Elite Bildungszentrum
Atelier Irmak
Kiraathane Ostermündingen
Istanbul Kebap Bern
La Boccia CDF
Meet Point
Istanbul Kebap Neuchâtel
Au Paradis Neuchâtel
Private Garden Party
Kiraathane CDF