THE ROLE OF CULTURAL HERITAGE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SENSE OF BELONGING AMONG YOUNG NORWEGIAN TURKS: BOUNDARY MAKING AND CROSSING

INTRODUCTION

The notion of culture, in the context of international migration, has gained a pejorative meaning as an explanatory factor for the conflicts between immigrants and native members of the receiving societies (Alghasi et al. 2009, p.5). The so-called culture of immigrants has been widely regarded in hegemonic discourse as a limitation to integration; its connotations are generally negative, especially with regard to non-Western immigrants, referencing patriarchal violence, including forced marriages and the criminal activity of male youths. Taking, however, the immigrants’ point of view, culture, understood as a set of values, traditions and patterns of behaviour brought by the first generation of newcomers from their background localities, is often seen as a positive, distinguishing factor. Some of those practices, traditions and values constitute the cultural heritage of a group and an important reference for immigrants’ self-identification. This chapter focuses on the role that such cultural heritage plays in the development of the sense of belonging to both the immigrants’ place of origin and the host country. It seeks to answer the question of whether heritage contributes to the cultural integration of immigrants or rather limits it. The use of heritage in making and crossing the boundary of ethnicity is also discussed here. As far as I know, cultural heritage has not been problematized in relation to immigrants’ integration to the host society and the development of their sense of belonging. Even though Europe generally recognizes the rich cultural heritage of non-Western civilizations, it is rarely linked to the immigrants themselves - the de facto representatives of those civilizations residing in Europe. Generally, analyses of heritage are rather absent in migration studies, while, as I argue, it may contribute to a better understanding of immigrants’ strategies of succeeding in the host society.

Drawing on works of various scholars, cultural heritage is understood here as a representation of the past in the present (Petterson 2009, p.66), which is never objective and always based on the present needs of particular groups and the power relations within them (Graham 2002, p.1004; Macdonald 2013). Heritage is created in the processes of remembering and forgetting (Graham 2002, p.1004) and can be represented via tangible and intangible elements such as values, traditions, practices, artefacts or landscapes. Heritage is collective and is usually linked to the level of a group or institution. Nevertheless, heritage is reproduced and refined by actions of individuals. The focus in this paper is thus on the traditions, values and practices of individual members of a heterogeneous

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1 I use the concept of the host society throughout the text when referring to the society that received immigrants. This does not, however, indicate that immigrants do not constitute a part of the host society.
community of Norwegian Turks, which constitute heritage and which are arenas of heritage’s negotiations.

Another core focus of this paper is the development of the sense of belonging, seen as a process taking place during the whole course of one’s life. Belonging has more in common with the concept of identification with groups and places than with an essentialist and rather stable notion of identity. Nira Yuval Davies (2006) argues that there is a difference between belonging and the politics of belonging. Belonging covers the idea of “feeling at home” within a particular socio-geographical setting, while the politics of belonging seek to construct belonging to specific groups via planned political programs (Yuval-Davis 2011, pp.4–5). This paper focuses primarily on a personal feeling of belonging that comprises feeling at home. The theoretical framework of the paper is supported by Fredrik Barth’s concept of ethnicity and ethnic boundaries (Barth 1969). Ethnicity is regarded here as “a social process of maintaining boundaries that the people themselves recognize as ethnicity” (Baumann 1999, p.59). It is thus understood as an organizational principle (Baumann 1994) and an effect of social interactions and individuals’ self-consciousness (Cohen 1994), not as an expression of natural cultural differences. Such selection of theory reflects the empirical findings in which a sense of belonging to particular places (both in Norway and in Turkey) is frequently brought up by the respondents, together with a strong idea of an ethnic identity that is understood as a boundary between us – Turks – and them – Norwegians. The boundary is built on the positive values shared in the respondents’ families, which contrast with disapproved practices of the others – usually Norwegians. On the other hand, in very many areas, the practices of Norwegian Turks are the same as those of the others, and the boundary becomes blurred and negotiated, which reflects Barth’s idea of maintaining an illusory ethnic boundary across shared values and lifestyles.

NORWEGIAN TURKS IN DRAMMEN

Research discussed in this paper was conducted among Norwegian Turks in the city of Drammen between December 2012 and January 2014. It is comprised of 12 in-depth interviews with second- and third-generation Norwegian Turks. The analysis of the interviews was contextualized by the data collected in an extensive ethnographic observation in Drammen, conducted simultaneously with the interviews. The observation was comprised of photo documentation of the area, participation in activities organized by and for Norwegian Turks, semi-structured interviews with owners and employees of the facilities run and frequented by the Norwegian Turks, expert interviews and unstructured interviews with the inhabitants of the city.

The majority of the participants’ ancestors came to Norway from small villages in the Konya province of Turkey as guest workers. Konya is one of the most conservative areas of Turkey, populated predominantly by Sunni Muslims. One respondent, however, admitted to having roots in a village in the area of the Black Sea in Turkey, further to the north. Due to internal migration in Turkey, many of respondents’ family members who remained in Turkey now live in bigger cities such as Ankara, Istanbul or Izmir. The rest remain in the villages of origin. All these places are destinations of yearly trips to Turkey; popular among the majority of the respondents.

All but one respondent was born in Norway. Everyone has participated in the Norwegian education system and is fluent in Norwegian. Everyone also, at the time of the interview, was employed or enrolled in university. The jobs of those who worked ranged from manual labour, to kindergarten teachers, sales assistants, waiters and qualified office workers. Generally, more women than men had graduated from university. Moreover, none of the women were employed as manual

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2 For the critic of the notion of identity see for example Anthias (2015)
labourers. Respondents were aged between 19 and 35 years. Some of them were single, some were married or married with kids; a heteronormative form of marriage was taken for granted by all of them. Six respondents had an Alevi background, while five of the participants had a Sunni background. The respondents classified themselves as second-, third-or-fourth-generation. Formally, however, based on the official definitions of newcomers by Statistic Norway (SSB Statistics Norway 2015), the majority of the respondents should be classified as Norwegian-born to immigrant parents, one respondent would be classified as an immigrant, and the rest should not be counted as part of a minority group at all\(^3\). To give the reader an idea of respondents’ settlement level in Norway, I have formulated my own definition of generation, based on the background of the parent who has been living in Norway the longest. I define an individual as second-generation if one was either born in Norway or arrived here no later than at the age of 10 and has two foreign parents and four foreign grandparents. Into the category of the third-generation fall all of the respondents who have at least one parent meeting the definition of second-generation. Such a classification is much closer to the respondent’s own self-definition, moreover, it avoids the ignorance of the differences between the experiences of young and adult immigrants that is present in Statistics Norway’s classification and also solves the problem of imported spouses of second- and third-generation Norwegian Turks. Following this classification, the majority of the respondents should be defined as second-generation and a few of them fall into the category of third-generation. Nevertheless, the self-classification of immigrants as 3rd or 4th generation, while they would officially be classified by the Statistics Norway as 1st or 2nd generation, highlights their sense of belonging to Norway within the framework of Turkish ethnicity, and is the fact of the greatest importance for the research discussed here.

The city of Drammen, where the data was collected, is situated in the eastern part of Norway, not far from the Norwegian capital – Oslo. 25% of the city’s inhabitants are of immigrant origin\(^4\) (Høydahl 2014) and the majority of these people have a Turkish background (13.5%). 62% of the people of Turkish origin who settled in Drammen have been living in Norway for more than 21 years. They are thus quite well-settled and have made their imprint on the city’s landscape by opening ethnic facilities, mostly in Drammen’s commercial ethnic neighbourhood, such as halal butcher shops, restaurants and groceries which serve and sell imported products and Turkish cuisine. Moreover, Norwegian Turks have changed the meaning of many places in Drammen by establishing Turkish mosques and ethnic clubs inside the existing buildings, church included, and imposing on them a transnational dimension. People of immigrant backgrounds are present in all of the city’s districts. However, the biggest concentration (44%)\(^5\) was observed in the Fjell district, where the majority of dwellings are housing blocks.

The group referred to in the abovementioned statistics as having a “Turkish background” is highly diversified and does not constitute one homogeneous community of the Turks. There are three different mosques for Sunni Muslims, an Alevi cultural centre and several informal ethnic clubs in the city, where different groups of people gather. The majority of Drammen’s Norwegian Turks originate from the Konya province, but there are also people from different places, and even a few ethnic Turks from Bulgaria\(^6\). Moreover, there is an existential boundary between Sunni Muslims and Alevi Turks, even when both groups originate from the same area of Konya. All of these characteristics overlap with socio-economic differences between individuals. Many of the mentioned nuances, tensions and characteristics are present in the narrations and mirrored by the respondents. For the

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\(^3\) Statistics Norway proposes the following definition of (1) immigrants: “Persons born abroad of two foreign-born parents and four foreign-born grandparents. Immigrants immigrated to Norway at some point”; (2) Norwegian-born to immigrant parents: “Persons born in Norway of two foreign-born parents and four foreign-born grandparents”. (SSB Statistics Norway 2015)

\(^4\) Immigrants and Norwegian-born to two immigrant parents (SSB Statistics Norway 2015)

\(^5\) As noted in Drammen Kommune (n.d. available online).

\(^6\) Bulgarian Turks appear in Norwegian statistics as Bulgarians even though they identify themselves as Turks.
purposes of this paper I will discuss briefly the difference between Sunnism and Alevism since this background was a variable responsible for the differentiations in the part of the respondent’s statements.

David Shankland (2012), a prominent scholar of Islam in Turkey clarifies the division between Arabic and Turkish Islam. He argues:

Turkish Islam was in any case rooted in Anatolian countryside, the mosque, the cemetery and the rhythm of the religious festivals and daily prayer, rather than in a sophisticated understanding of the Arab-based Sharia (Shankland 2012, p.108).

Turkish Islam was shaped by the secular framework of the modern nation state. There are presently two main groups of Muslims in Turkey – the majority are Sunnis and there is a smaller group of Alevis, constituting approximately 10-12% of the Muslim population in the country (ibid., p.107). Shankland continues:

The Sunni population is, broadly speaking, conventional in terms of belief and doctrine as it is usually understood. Though there is enormous variation in actual practice, it is held to be usual for believer to maintain the literal truth of Qur’an and to uphold the “five pillars” of Islam: believe in God, pray, fast, pay alms and undertake the pilgrimage to Mecca (Shankland 2012, p.108).

Defining Alevism is not an easy task due to the ambiguity of the term, being sometimes referred to as a religious belief and sometimes as an identity. “Many scholars define Alevi as a heterodox Muslim group with roots in Turkey; a few activists identify it as a distinct belief system and lifestyle that is outside Islam.” (Özyürek 2009, p.236; see also Shankland 2007, p.1). Shankland argues:

Alevi doctrine, while it does not reject the “five pillars”, emphasizes the esoteric side of religious life, the God that is found within all human beings. (...) This emphasis on the inner self and individual conduct, rather than outward fulfilment of doctrinally prescribed practices, means that they favour a state that does not promote the public expression of faith (Shankland 2012, p.113).

The members of the Alevi community that I researched generally did not follow the custom of fasting during Ramadan nor performing daily prayers. Moreover, the women in the community were not veiled, nor did they occupy a different space than men in the religious house. It seemed that the traditional gendered spatial division was not present in the Alevi community. On the other hand, in Sunni communities that I visited, gender division was inscribed in the space of mosques, as it is in Turkey. Moreover, access to the ethnic clubs in the city was typically limited only to men. Additionally, many (but not all) women linked to the Sunni community that I encountered in the field were veiled. The Sunni Norwegian Turks tended to practice daily prayers more often and fast during Ramadan, however not in an orthodox way.

FROM TURKEY TO NORWAY. THE CONTEXT OF A SENDING AND RECEIVING COUNTRY

The modern Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, replacing the remains of the Ottoman Empire. Extensive modernization, secularization and westernization of the country contributed to today’s position of Turkey, often seen as a bridge between the so-called Western countries and the predominantly Muslim countries of the Middle East. The population of Turkey, reaching almost 80 million people, is generally Muslim, with the majority of a Sunni background. Historically, the country was home to many religious and ethnic minorities, including a
significant number of non-Muslim groups, such as Greeks, Armenians and Jews. However, during the nation-building processes, Islam became part of the definition of a Turk and non-Muslim ethnic minorities’ otherness became obvious. It led many of the non-Muslim minorities to voluntary or forced mass emigration from Turkey (İçduygu et al. 2008, p.359). Contrary to appearances, however, today’s Turkey, despite its 99% Muslim population (ibid.), is not a homogeneous land and remains home to plenty of ethnic and religious minorities (Shankland 2007, p.14). Among these, one should mention Kurds, who represent 15-20% (Romano 2014), or as some authors estimate even 23% (McDowall 2007), of the total Turkish population. The biggest religious minority of Turkey are Alevis, constituting around 15% of the Turkish population (Dressler 2008, p.281; Shankland 2007, p.20).

Apart from the significant emigration wave of non-Muslim minorities in 1920, until the 1960s, emigration from Turkey had been rather been limited (İçduygu 2012, pp.13–14). In 1961 however, the Turkish government, as part of the country’s development plan and in response to the labour force deficit in Western European countries, signed the Labour Force Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany and later with other countries, becoming one of the largest suppliers of migrant workers in Western Europe (İçduygu & Tekelioglu 1995, p.205). The oil crisis in the 1970s led to the announcement of a ban on immigration, which was introduced in Norway in 1975 (Eriksen 2013). Many of the immigrants, however, converted their temporary stay to a permanent one and the migration to Western Europe continued in other forms: “[A]lthough the labour movement from Turkey ceased in the early 1970s, migration did not end, but subsequently took such other forms as family reunion, refugee movement, and clandestine labour migration” (İçduygu 2012).

Migration from Turkey to Norway has generally mirrored the general labour mobility pattern from Turkey to Western Europe with the arrival of pioneers followed later by their families. First Turks came to Norway as “guest workers” at the end of the 1960s. In 1970 there were already 260 Turks in Norway, and together with Moroccans, Pakistanis and citizens of India, they represented 40% of the immigrant population from developing countries in Norway (Brochmann & Kjeldstadli 2008, p.194). The area of Drammen was the main destination for newcomers from Turkey. As Næess (1985, p.52) indicates, the first group of Turks came to Mjøndalen Cellulose in 1967 from Şivasli in Üşak (Turkey). After that, many small groups of Turkish workers arrived in Drammen. A significant number of guest workers came from Beyşehir in the Konya province (Türker 2000, p.34). Since the main reason for Turkish migration to Norway was to take unskilled jobs (Blom 1997, p.17; in Nistov 2001, p.94; Steinkellner & Rustad Holseter 2013, p.34), those who were recruited had a poor level of education, which especially applied to women. Today, despite immigration from different regions of Turkey, inhabitants of Turkish origins have their roots first and foremost in the villages surrounding Konya and Üşak, and partly in Ankara and the village called Sivas. A majority of them live in Oslo and Drammen, but also in Moss, Trondheim, Stavanger and Lærenskog.

Presently there are 11,049 immigrants from Turkey in Norway representing, together with Norwegian-born to Turkish immigrant parents (6,559), the thirteenth-largest group. Together with Norwegian-born with one foreign-born (Turkish) parent (3,279) and those born in Norway to Norwegian-born parents with Turkish origin (537) they constitute a group of 21,424 people of Turkish origin in Norway (SSB Statistics Norway 2015). Migration from Turkey to Norway continues until today, however on a relatively small scale.

As other studies show, people of Turkish origin in Norway vary significantly. Apart from the differences between Sunnis and Alevis described in the previous section, Norwegian Turks have different attitudes towards identification with Turkey, religion and modernization. The Kurdish issue is still discussed in some immigrant communities in Nordic countries (see Necef 1996; Bilgin 1998).

7 Those groups have been given an official minority status.
8 Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands in 1964, France in 1965; Australia and Sweden in 1967 plus other agreements with the UK in 1961, Switzerland in 1971 and Denmark in 1973 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011).
Also discussions on Atatürk’s reform and its consequences for the country are ongoing among Turks abroad (see Astad 1993). Besides ideological, religious and ethnic issues, Norwegian Turks vary according to their socio-economic characteristics such as class, education, or professional prestige. People of Turkish origin in Norway are definitely not a homogenous group and should not be regarded as such.

The Norwegian immigration policy model is generally classified as close to multicultural. In 1980 the assimilationist strategy towards immigrants was officially rejected and immigrant culture was given the right to protection (Hagelund 2002, p.407). Some scholars propose calling the Norwegian immigration policy “de facto multiculturalism” (Akkerman & Hagelund 2007, pp.197–198). The country, however, has never declared multiculturalism as its official policy (Hagelund 2003). Providing equal rights and duties towards the host society as well as the inclusion of immigrants into Norwegian society has been the main aim of Norwegian immigration policy for a long time (Stjernø Committee 2008, pp.69–70). Recently, the idea of cultural diversity as an important resource in multicultural Norway has been added (Meld. St. 6 2012), transforming, at least officially, immigrants “cultural” characteristics into a positive value.

**METHODOLOGY**

The methodological framework of the research discussed here is described by Situational Analysis—an inductive method drawn up by Adele Clark (2005; 2009). The data was collected between December 2012 and January 2014, using the technique of semi-structured in-depth interviewing. 12 interviews with second- and third-generation Norwegian Turks are discussed here. The interviews started from the “self-portrait without self” schema. Respondents were asked to name and write down things that made them who they are. The things were divided into five separate groups: (1) belongings that are important to the respondents; (2) spaces, places and landscapes they identify with; (3) people who made them who they are; (4) ideas, values, and emotions which describe them; and (5) activities in which they can express themselves. The first part of the interview was designed as a discussion of the elements written down by the respondents. Interlocutors were asked for explanations why the thing, place, person, idea or activity was important for them and how it made them who they are. During this part, the respondents were also asked to briefly introduce themselves. The second part of the interview was more structured and was comprised of questions concerning respondents’ routine practices. The design of the interview sought to avoid classification of practices and identifications as Turkish or Norwegian. However, such classification was often made by the respondents themselves during narrations. The interviews were anonymous. All but one were conducted in Norwegian; one was conducted in English. Norwegian was chosen as the language of interviewing so as not to give priority to the Turkish identification of the respondents, which could have influenced the findings. It seemed to be the most neutral choice, since the interviews were conducted in Norway, where Norwegian is spoken by minorities in public. All but one interview was recorded and transcribed; one respondent did not give his consent to be recorded. The interviews were conducted in various locations; in public places and in ethnic clubs. The author was never invited to a private house.

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9 The inspiration came from Douglas Harper’s visual method of self-portrait without self (Harper 2012). My intention was to use it in its original form. Unfortunately, the respondents were not willing to take pictures so I transformed the visual task into the written schema.

10 The interview was conducted in English as a result of respondent’s suggestion. It did not happen because the respondent was not fluent in Norwegian but was a courtesy to the researcher, who was more fluent in English than in Norwegian.
The sample was selected via snowball sampling. I visited Turkish facilities in the city asking for contact with people who could participate in the study. The whole process was difficult, due to many immediate rejections and withdrawals after giving consent for participation in the study. Eventually, I interviewed 12 respondents, representing different genders, levels of education, sectors of employment and who were linked to different Turkish communities in Drammen. Their common feature was a rural origin and the former “guest worker” status of their ancestors. Moreover, the majority of the respondent’s ancestors had their roots in a conservative area of the Konya province.

Since opposition to participation in the study among Norwegian Turks in Drammen was quite common, those who were eventually recruited might have represented, firstly, a more active and, secondly, a more open group. One should not, however, draw too far-reaching conclusions from the reluctance towards my research among Norwegian Turks given the growing islamophobia in Western Europe (Eriksen 2013). As one of the leaders of a Turkish mosque in Drammen told me, people might have been afraid of saying something that could put the Norwegian Turks community in a bad light, contributing to anti-Muslim attitudes.

The position of the researcher could be described as a position of a dual outsider. Being of Polish origin made me an immigrant, a representative of what is presently the biggest immigrant group in Norway - Poles. On the other hand, I did not belong to the researched group of Norwegian Turks either. Since I studied the Norwegian language only for the purposes of the research, my fluency in Norwegian was still limited and the respondents could have easily been aware of it. Owing to that, my position from the first moments of the interactions was obviously a position of a stranger and the respondents’ sense of belonging to Norway was clearly much stronger than mine. Additionally, I was considered by many to be a young student doing her homework. The interviews thus were mainly not burdened with the seriousness of an academic investigation. On the other hand, my interest in and knowledge of Turkey, being familiar with small cities and villages of the respondents’ ancestors’ origin, as well as my ability to speak basic Turkish, were interpreted by many as a sign of respect for Turkish heritage and it contributed to the atmosphere of friendship and understanding during the interviews. Those factors made respondents feel rather relaxed and open from the very beginning. Sometimes they would use our shared position as non-Norwegians and talk about Norwegian society from the perspective of an immigrant. Sometimes they would compare the situation of their ancestors, who arrived as pioneers in Norway, to mine. Generally, my outsider’s position might have contributed to respondents’ criticisms towards Norway and underlining the positive values of Turkey.

**HERITAGE AND BELONGING. BOUNDARY MAKING AND CROSSING**

The respondents built their narrations around several axes such as “Turkishness”, Islam, work and social life. The most common one was widely understood “Turkishness” that covered practices and values assumed to be common in Turkish society and among ethnic Turks. The second important axis was Islam and it primarily includes religious traditions typical of Turkish Sunni Islam. Narrations that hovered around work and social life were rare and delivered exclusively by young, unmarried respondents. Despite the fact that all of the respondents participate in each of the aforementioned areas: Turkish and religious communities; work (school); and social life, the majority chose to build their narrations around their Turkish heritage. It reveals their self-identification as Turks, and their sense of belonging to their ancestors’ places of origin in Turkey. On the other hand, the threads

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11 The practices common in Turkish Sunni Islam were also present in the narrations built around “Turkishness”. However, those who built their narrations around the axis of Islam presented a lack of threads concerning secular values and practices common in Turkey. Since the religious axis was chosen exclusively by the respondents with Sunni backgrounds I mention here practices of Turkish Sunni Islam.
concerning participation in Norwegian society, through professional work or sharing particular values and practices common in the Norwegian society indicate the other side of belonging – the local belonging to Norway. The following sections of this paper discusses how dual belonging to Norway and Turkey is organized and realized by the respondents and how the boundaries between us and others are being made and crossed. The paper seeks to answer the question: what is the role of cultural heritage in the development of the sense of belonging and group's boundary making and crossing?

Dual Belonging

The respondents were asked to name the places that have made them who they are and that are important to them. The great majority of answers included a combination of localities in Norway and Turkey. Among the places named in Norway, usually the city of Drammen where respondents lived was mentioned, often with special regard to a particular district where respondents grew up. Without a doubt, the local sense of belonging to the Norwegian city was shared among the respondents and, along with the mentioned district, incorporated the true idea of home:

The most important landscape for me is [the District in Drammen] because this is where I grew up; all of my friends are from [there]. I feel at home there. If I for example drive from Oslo, I feel like I am in a foreign place. But when I start driving towards [The District in the City], I feel at home. When I am in [another city], I am bored. But when I drive towards [The District in the City], even though there is nothing to do here, I feel at home. So the most important area for me is [the District in the City]. Otherwise it doesn’t matter to me where I am (Alevi Respondent 7).

Areas... I have mainly written Drammen since I was born and raised here. Drammen has formed me. I was born here, I raised here, I still live here and even my University College is here (...). I have also written [The District in the City]. This is where I live. (...) I belong to Drammen. (Alevi Respondent 12)

While all the respondents expressed a strong local attachment to Norway, the majority of them simultaneously reported an attachment to localities in Turkey. This especially applied to the Norwegian Turks with a Sunni background regardless of their generation. Many of the interlocutors told me at the beginning of the conversation that they were from Turkey, ignoring the fact that they were born and raised in Norway. They labelled the city of Konya home, where most of the Norwegian Turks in the city have their roots12:

I was born and raised in Norway but I am originally from Turkey, of course. I come from Konya (Sunni Respondent 8).

Local belonging to the places in Turkey refers to the phenomenon of autochthony understood as being “born from the soil” (Geschiere 2009, p.ix). One of the respondents (Sunni Respondent 9) expresses the idea of autochthony by explicit reference to the Turkic peoples and Anatolian Culture as “the real roots” of Turks with whom the respondents identifies. These discourses of Anatolia as the cradle of Turkish culture and the brotherhood of Turkic peoples have also been present in Turkey. A rural Anatolian origin has been regarded in common Turkish discourse as a metaphor

12In a further conversation, they often changed Konya first to a smaller city in the province and eventually to the exact villages in the area from which their ancestors originated. The city of Konya was commonly used in the community of Norwegian Turks due to the assumption that the interlocutor did not know Turkish geography.
forbeing honourable and it was traditionally opposed to urban life, which was synonymous with losing one’s innocence due to modernization and western influences. The discourse of the people of Anatolia as the real ancestors of Turks was also present in Atatürk’s rhetoric and played a role in the nation-building processes in Turkey.

The autochthonic discourse of “real” belonging had another dimension in the narrations that involved blood ties with the soil:

Had they instructed me that I should [choose to] stay either in Turkey or in Norway, so I would have chosen Turkey. Because that’s where my blood really originated. (Sunni Respondent 11)

Belonging to Turkey is often supported and legitimized by the fact of having a home in Turkey. Some respondents or their families do own a house in Turkey, often in the local areas of their ancestors’ origin. These houses serve as holiday residences and owning them mirrors similar practices of many middle-class ethnic Norwegians who—for other reasons—buy houses in the South, including Turkey. Norwegian Turks’ yearly journey to Turkey has become a tradition, facilitated by home ownership, imposing an additional element of meaning on these trips; that of “coming back home”.

Respondents of Alevi origin tended to express a quite strong sense of belonging primarily to Norway. A few people who did not articulate any attachment to Turkey were of Alevi origin. However, the rest of Alevi Norwegian Turks declared their sense of belonging to Turkey. The place in Turkey they labelled “home” was however not the village of their ancestors in the Konya Province, but one of the most modern cities in Turkey—Izmir where their families who remained in Turkey currently live:

I like Drammen very much. This is my city. (...) I feel at home here. But I have also written Turkey—Izmir. This is my second home. My mother and father are from Turkey, so I am part of that (Alevi Respondent 4).

Some of the Alevi respondents express non-identification with Konya, explicitly marking the striking difference between the habits common in the province and contrasting them to the mentioned Turkish city: “Everyone in Konya is very religious. (...) But in Izmir, it is like in Norway, people are modern. (...) Izmir suits me better than Konya” (Alevi Respondent 12).

The relationship between Sunni Muslims and Alevi people in Turkey aresaddled with a negative heritage. The pogroms of Alevists in the past and little support given to them from the government in today’s Turkey might influence their strong attachment to Norway, where the Alevi community can freely follow its liberal version of Islam. It could also be an explanatory factor for the rejection of conservative and predominantly Sunni Konya in favour of other modern Turkish cities.

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13Ersayüzürek (2009, p.237) mentions several pogroms of Alevis in Turkey: “(...) hundreds of Alevis were killed by Sunni Muslim and Turkish nationalist fanatics in Sivas (1978 and 1993), Kahramanmaras (1978), Çorum (1980), and Gazi in Istanbul in 1997”. (See also Shankland 2007, p.1)

14In Turkey there is a governmental department, the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DiyanetislereBaskanligi), which oversees matters of religion in the country. As Elisabeth Özdağla (2012, p.213) argues: “Its field of activity is more or less defined by four pillars of Islam — ritual prayer (namaz), fasting during Ramadan (oruç), pilgrimage (hac), and almsgiving (zekat) — as well as sacrifice (kurban). To this have been added education (Qur’an courses), seminars and conferences and various publishing activities.” The directorate however ignores in its activity the Alevis — the biggest religious minority in Turkey. Özdağla (ibid.) continues: “The Diyanet has played a stabilizing role with respect to Sunni Islam, but in relation to the Alevi community it has failed to fulfill its mission as a secular — or neutral — institution. Alevi grievances are concentrated on the lack of representation within the Diyanet, the total silence on Alevism in public school education, and the unwillingness to allow special houses of worship (cemevi) for Alevis.” (See also Shankland 2012, p.113)
Belonging consists of much more than a place. As FloyaAnthias argues, “belonging asks about ‘to what’ and ‘with whom’ you are a member, where and by whom you are accepted and you feel attached to” (Anthias 2015, p.7). The places in Turkey and in Norway that were mentioned, which have become arenas of respondents’ belonging, are strictly connected to people and communities acting within those localities.

An important arena of social belonging of the respondents is family. All of them claimed that their family had played a significant role in their lives:

The Family means for me to support each other, to stand back each other when one need help. I have received a lot from my family (Sunni Respondent 11).

Some respondents indicated that they feel at home in Norway since their family is there. Family is not limited to their closest relatives. While talking about family, the respondents refer rather to their extended family, with the number of members reaching more than 50 people. Most of the respondents claimed to have a significant number of family members living in the area of Drammen. Family is an institution within which mutual support, including financial, is common. Family is also an arena in which practices, traditions and values that constitute elements of Turkish heritage are recreated and renegotiated: “Culture is the tradition of my family, because I share something from them. Norwegian, Turkish traditions, both” (Sunni Respondent 3). Turkish Bayrams (religious celebrations) are followed with and within the family, and family meetings are pretexts to cook time-consuming Turkish dishes. Finally, family instils certain values, such as respect for and obedience to older people. Family is an important reference point for all the respondents and family members are claimed to have shaped the personality of the respondent. Described processes reflect the significance of kinship in traditional Turkish society (Meeker 2002) as well as a collective, rather than individualistic, orientation of an entity.

Besides the family, another arena where social belonging is realized, are formal and informal Turkish communities in Norway. Very strong belonging to a formal Alevi community was observed among all the respondents with an Alevi background. For Sunni respondents, important Turkish communities, except for Turkish mosques, were rather informal or semi-formal ones – friend circles and semi-formal ethnic clubs, which gathered men originating from particular places in Turkey. The groups and institutions run by, and designed for, Norwegian Turks provide activities as diverse as Turkish dance, Turkish guitar classes, worship practices, Turkish cooking courses or activities such as playing cards and board games while drinking tea. Those activities are either common practices of many people in Turkey or they refer directly to the Turkish cultural heritage, turning the communities into the arenas of heritage maintenance, recreation and renegotiation.

Gender division is one of the more controversial elements of Turkish heritage, criticized on the one hand by many Norwegian Turks, on the other, maintained within many formal and informal communities of Norwegian Turks. Ethnic clubs frequented by Sunni Norwegian Turks maintain a traditional gender division and the presence of women is rather uncommon there. Conversely, Turkish cuisine courses are frequented rather exclusively by women. In addition, Sunni mosques provide separate spaces for men and women, contributing to the maintenance of a gender division that has traditionally been common in Turkey, especially in rural areas, though it is rather unacceptable in Norway.

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35See for example the discussion around Islamic seminar that took place at the Oslo and Akershus University College, and was organized by one of the religious association of Norwegian Turks. During the seminar, men were asked to sit separately from women. This opened a discussion in which many secular Norwegian Turks took part, criticizing the organizers and blaming them for giving a false idea of the Turkish community in Norway (for details see Torset 2014; text in Norwegian)
Participation in communities of Norwegian Turks in Drammen deepen the sense of autochthonic belonging to Turkey and strengthens the group’s boundary. However, the main contribution of these communities is building the attachment to the local in Norway. Consequently, the majority of the respondents declare dual belonging to both the host country and the country of their ancestors’ origin, and these belongings are realized through the local Turkish community in Norway.

**Dual (non)belonging**

The quest for being indigenous, expressed in respondent’s declaration of “being from Turkey” is the reflection of the gradually common discourses of autochthony in Europe observed by Peter Geschiere (2009) in his book *The Perils of Belonging: Autochthony, Citizenship, and Exclusion in Africa and Europe*. Such discourses seek to approach identity as being deeply rooted in local and has the effect of making immigrants and their offspring born in the host country foreign. The problem described by Geschiere exists in Norway as well, where members of immigrant minorities might still be asked about where they *really* come from. The quest for autochthony forces minorities to create an idea of “the real home” in the remote localities they or their ancestors left many years ago. Such strategies provide an alternative story to build one’s self-definition and limit the risk of feeling of “being from nowhere”. In some cases – such “remoted” belonging is shared with enthusiasm. In others, however, it may lead to a crisis of belonging in which members of immigrant minorities are stuck in-between localities, unable to be fully accepted in any of them. The problem of such dual non-belonging is well-described in the statements of respondent two, who arrived in Norway when she was ten years old. In the first part of her statement, she refers to her autochthonic belonging to Turkey. In the second part of the statement she expresses her private opinion of where she feels at home:

> Turkey is my homeland. When I arrive there, with no doubt I am at home. But, when I arrive in Norway, I am of course foreign (...). When I am in Oslo, I am foreign, but not in Turkey. Nevertheless, I feel at home here [in Norway] because here I have my life, my friends, my relatives, my family is here. (...) I couldn’t think about moving back to Turkey. I have more here [in Norway] than there (Sunni respondent 2).

Later in the conversation, respondent two admits to being treated as a foreigner both in Turkey and in Norway:

> I don’t feel at home in Turkey either because (...) they say there that you are from abroad in a way. (...) [In Norway, on the other hand,] even if one forgets that one is foreign here, the others will never forget it (Sunni respondent 2).

Significant is the fact that this sense of non-belonging is created and enforced by others – both Turks and Norwegians, while the respondent herself has a quite clear idea of where she feels at home. As Ahmet İçduyuğu (2009, p.26) argues, Turks who emigrated aboard were given the nickname “Almanyali” – translated directly as “Turks from Germany” by the non-migrant population in Turkey, due to their modernized behaviour in comparison to those who stayed in the villages. They have also gained a higher social status than the villagers who remained in Turkey (ibid.). As shown in the respondents’ statements, being perceived as a different from local people in Turkey is neither new nor beneficial to them. One way this can be seen is through changes in language. The language used by the Turks abroad, including the second and further generations, has not gone through the same changes as the Turkish used in Turkey, and therefore it might sound a bit old-fashioned or foreign in Turkey. What is more, there is an ambiguity arising from the low prestige of the former “guest workers” in the class–conscious Turkish society on the one hand, and their actual wealth on the other. All of these factors contribute to the processes of “othering” of Turks who have settled abroad.
and their offspring. Simultaneously, the quest for autochthony in the host countries, including Norway, contributes to the otherness of the host-country-born Turks.

Another Sunni Respondent who declared a strong attachment to Turkey also admitted further in the narration that she was excluded from Turkish society and marked there as foreign:

I feel at home more in Norway than in Turkey. I feel foreign once I am down there (in Turkey). If you (...) didn’t know that I was from Turkey, you wouldn’t guess I am foreign [in Norway] because you couldn’t hear it from my language. But when I am in Turkey, then at once: “Are you coming from abroad?” (Sunni Respondent 8).

Respondent eight recalls the already signalized problem of language as an excluding factor in the country of ancestors’ origin. The language is undoubtedly an important element of Norwegian Turks’ heritage. Turkish is widely spoken in the Turkish community; all the respondents use Turkish at home and consider it their mother tongue. The language marks a clear boundary of Turkish ethnicity and strengthens the sense of belonging to the Turkish community in Norway. The use of Turkish in Turkey, however, becomes, as in the case of the respondent eight, an excluding factor due to the different accent the respondent has. On the other hand, being fluent in Norwegian allows crossing of the group’s boundary, towards the Norwegian society. This explains the attempts of many of the respondents to provide Norwegian language fluency for their children. The adaptation to the Norwegian society that the respondents themselves reached through fluency in Norwegian is seen of value and the respondents attempt to provide the best opportunities of Norwegian language development for their kids. This is a starting point for a discussion on the heritage of Norwegian Turks and the question that arises here is whether the Norwegian language will become an element of Norwegian Turks’ heritage in the future.

As I have exemplified above, dual belonging is sometimes responsible for a crisis of belonging. The necessity of constant negotiations of belonging blurs the self-definition of the respondents, making them seemingly stuck in in-betweeness:

I feel that I am 50\%50. I am not fully Turk. (...) I cannot say I am fully Turk nor can I say that I am fully Norwegian (Alevi Respondent 12).

The solution for such vagueness of self-definition is the development of the sense of belonging to the local in Norway. It is done through participation in formal and informal networks of Norwegian Turks, as well as via an attachment to local places in Norway. It should not, however, be regarded as an integration into the Turkish community, but rather an integration into Norwegian society under the umbrella identification of Turks. Belonging to social networks of Norwegian Turks, which are strengthened and maintained thanks to a shared heritage, makes the respondents comfortable in the local environment in Norway. Consequently, it gives them the foundation for renegotiations of traditional practices and values, bringing them closer to those common among ethnic Norwegians, without, however, losing the sense of autochthonic attachment to Turkey. Even if the so-called in-betweeness, is a fact from the national-ethnic perspective of Turkey and Norway, the respondents are not between the localities. They develop a hybrid identification with Norway under the umbrella of “Turkishness”, and put in force hybrid practices and values combining Turkish, Norwegian and global influences.

Heritage: boundary making and crossing.

As I have mentioned above, the quest for autochthony and crises of belonging are responsible for respondents seeking their own roots in Turkey, while legitimizing their presence in Norway. Since the belonging, especially of immigrants, is constantly questioned in Europe, both in everyday
conversations and in public and political discourse, it has become processual and constantly negotiated. This problem is especially acute for second and further generations, born in a host country, who are not fully accepted by members of a society they are growing up in nor have they had the chance to belong to another place “by birth”. Those people are forced to create their reflexive self-identity (Giddens 1991): their sense of belonging, their heritage and their culture, to reach compact narrations of their lives. To do so, they renegotiate and adjust Turkish history, traditions and practices inherited from their ancestors, to the living environment in Norway. In this section, I discuss practices that have become intersections of Turkish and Norwegian influences and that will eventually contribute to the cultural integration of Norwegian Turks into the host society.

One of the commonalities between Turkish heritage and the Norwegian system of values is the narration of the Ottoman Empire. Norwegian egalitarian values, with a focus on equality between people of any religious or ethnic background are shared by the most of the respondents. Some of them explicitly admit that this is what they like about Norway. Some, however, while sharing those values, do not link them with Norwegian society, but with the heritage of the Ottoman Empire:

I’d like to pass down the respect. This is what I identify with. In the Ottoman Empire, there were many different ethnicities and people but nobody’d force them to follow Islam. Everyone could’ve one’s own culture and religion. There was no racism but there was respect. If it hadn’t been for that respect, the Empire would’ve had collapsed. It wouldn’t have lasted that many years. Muslims would live with Christians and there was no problems (Sunni Respondent 9).

The respondent gives an example of Istanbul as a historically heterogeneous city. Indeed, the district known today as Beyoğlu, in Istanbul, was traditionally inhabited by many ethnic and religious minorities. However, while ethno-linguistic indifference was common in the Ottoman administration, İçduyg and Soner (2006, pp.448–449) argue that Ottoman policies, together with its millet system, which classified the inhabitants according to their religious origin, actually failed to provide equal treatment of disparate people. Modern Turkey, upon the foundation of the Republic in the 1920s, has actually followed the millet schema, incorporating Islam in the definition of a Turk and assuming the homogeneity of Muslims in the country (see İçduyg et al. 1999; İçduyg & Soner 2006, p.452). Those processes were responsible for the events that occurred in the 20th century in Turkey, which denied the idea of ethnic and religious equality, and the broadly discussed issue of the Armenian genocide (Akçam 2012; Suny 2015) can be included here. Moreover, the current conflict between Kurds and Turks and relatively limited governmental support of Alevis indicates that modern Turkey does not prioritize ethnic or religious equality in society. In contrast, the equality of all people is a principal that constitutes Norwegian heritage. The strategy of respondent nine, aiming at legitimizing the values inscribed in Norwegian society with the use of the Turkish past, helps him to create a compact narration of the self. He links his modern self to Turkish cultural heritage so as to reach the sense of direction and progress (Taylor 1989). As a consequence, the respondent achieves an agreement between the strong identification with Turkey and egalitarian values spread in Norway and eagerly shared by the respondent.

The concept of respect is one of the most important values shared by the respondents. It can be understood twofold: respect as equality between people of different backgrounds, as described by respondent nine, and respect as offering help to other people and acting with a polite demeanour towards elders as well as being obedient. The latter understanding of respect is widespread in Turkey:

[My mother has taught me] to show respect to older than me. For example, Norwegians can say “one’s name come here”. But have I done this in Turkey, would it be considered as rude. One should always say “brother”. (…) Abi or Abla 16. We have a lot of respect to those who

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16 Abi means in Turkish «older brother»; Abla means «older sister».  

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are older than we are and we are helpful to those who are younger than we are. (Sunni Respondent 11)

Such a hierarchy between people of different ages is uncommon in the flat structure of Norwegian society and many of the respondents build the boundary of Turkish ethnicity upon such an understanding of the concept of respect. Usually they combine it with the idea of helping others, broadly understood, and assume to be common among Turks but foreign in individually-oriented Norwegian society. On the other hand, respect, interpreted as equality, mirrors the values widespread in Norwegian society and maintaining it allows the crossing of boundaries between practices assumed as Turkish or Norwegian. Use of the concept of respect thus strengthens the respondents’ belonging to the group of ethnic Turks; at the same time, with the help of the Turkish past, it legitimizes the core value of Norwegian society, thereby facilitating integration into the host society without losing the autochthonic sense of belonging to what is called Turkish.

Traditions are other arenas in which Turkish heritage mixes with practices common in Norway and vice versa. The most widely celebrated traditions are religious Bayrams that are, however, linked to the general “Turkish” not rather than “Islamic” culture. Celebrating the traditions deepens the sense of belonging to Turkey and strengthens the border of Turkish ethnicity among Norwegian Turks. The respondents try to recreate a form of celebration from Turkey that involves eating Turkish food and visiting friends. However, in some cases, the way in which the festival is celebrated has been adjusted to the Norwegian reality. Some of the respondents include Christmas traditions such as an advent calendar in the celebration of Ramadan. Children are given small presents during the whole period of Ramadan, as is traditionally done in the Christian tradition during the advent.

They receive [the small gifts] during Ramadan. Before Ramadan and Ramadan Bayram they got the gifts. (...) Even if we don’t celebrate Christmas, now we do. (Sunni Respondent 2)

Christmas traditions that are widely celebrated in Norway have been included in Islamic religious festivities even though the respondents generally do not celebrate Christmas. Transforming Turkish traditions and adding elements of Christian heritage actually introduces a new hybrid practice that is linked more to the community of Norwegian Turks than to Turkey. The boundary of Turkish ethnicity is maintained, but the practices of the members of the group actually cross that boundary. This practice might be regarded as another potential intersection of Turkish and Norwegian heritage that may become a feature of a heritage of Norwegian Turks.

Another area where cultural practices of Norwegian Turks intertwine with Norwegian heritage is in celebration of May 17th, Norwegian Constitution Day. The day is widely celebrated by both ethnic Norwegians and minorities. Some Turkish communities, such as the Alevi association, organize celebrations of the day, including Turkish food in the celebrations. Individual Norwegian Turks celebrate by participating in the parade in the city, wearing nice clothes and waving the Norwegian flag.

I always participate in May 17th’s celebrations. I always take part in the May 17th parade. I have always been in. I go around with a Norwegian flag and I say “hip hip hurrah!” I am in the city. I have always wanted to buy a bunad. (Sunni Respondent 8)

Some of the female respondents indicated they would like to have a bunad – a traditional Norwegian folk costume that is widely used by women during the celebrations. This wish is however limited by the financial capacities of the respondents – a bunad is regarded by them as very expensive. Nevertheless, active participation in the celebrations of May 17th – one of the most important elements of Norwegian heritage, and the will to do it in a traditional folk dress, undoubtedly strengthens the sense of belonging to Norway. There are several bunad designs and each of them is attached to a particular place in the county. The question that arises here is whether the interest in a
bunad might express the respondent’s quest for autochthony in Norway. Since the respondents who articulate the desire to have a bunad were young females, one may assume that they were rather influenced by the fashion of wearing the costume widely spread among ethnic Norwegian female youths.

The May 17th parade maybe analysed as communitas, understood after Viktor Turner (1995) as an alternative institution of community that is free from everyday structures and hierarchies. In communitas all the people are equal and included. For that reason identification with Norwegian flag and Norwegian heritage, as well as an attempt to look like ethnic Norwegians, is easier to explicitly express in the context of the parade than in other circumstances. Participation in the May 17th communitas gives the respondents the chance to express their belonging to Norway publicly without risking criticism of their engagement. Even if the identification with communitas is temporal, the fact that participation is repeated yearly, together with practices such as dressing up and waving the Norwegian flag, indicates that Norwegian Turks have permanently joined and found their place in this Norwegian heritage.

The permanent place of the Turkish minority in May 17th celebrations in Norway involves the boundary making and crossing. On the one hand, the group boundary is maintained. On the other, the borderline of Norwegian heritage is crossed by sharing “Norwegian” practices, symbols and even clothing styles. In the context of the May 17th celebration, I observed the manifestation of belonging to the multicultural Norwegian society, with the maintenance of “Turkish” identification. Such belonging however was not the case for a few respondents, who rather declared themselves as external observers of the fest:

I know this is not my tradition, this is not my celebration. I was born and raised in Norway so I need to show respect [and celebrate May 17th] of course, but this is not my celebration, I don’t belong with it, I am an observer (Suni Respondent 11).

Nevertheless, despite the meaning given to the May 17th holiday by individuals, Constitution Day has become a tradition celebrated by the Norwegian Turks; in all of the narrations it was mentioned in line with Ramadan and KurbanBayram – religious holidays in Turkey. I would not risk saying that May 17th has become a heritage of Norwegian Turks since it is clearly Norwegian heritage, rather that Norwegian Turks have become part of this Norwegian heritage, celebrating it together with ethnic Norwegians, under the umbrella of identification as Turks and with the involvement of Turkish practices such as sharing Turkish food and paying visits to family or friends.

CONCLUSIONS

Heritage plays an important role in marking the boundary of Turkish ethnicity. It strengthens respondents’ autochthonic sense of belonging to Turkey and it is a foundation of respondents’ reflexive narrations of the self. Since the “natural” belonging to Norway of second- and third-generation Norwegian Turks is questioned, such a shift towards “Turkishness” is crucial for maintaining the compact self-definitions so as to avoid the feeling of “being from nowhere”. On the other hand, the fact of being born outside Turkey and the foreign accent when speaking in Turkish, cast doubt upon the respondents’ belonging to Turkey as well. Moreover, cultural practices and values that constitute Turkish heritage are subjects of constant renegotiations according to the circumstances and requirements of the host society. The sources of those practices date back to the 1960s and 1970s and refer to the rural origins of respondents’ ancestors. The changes that these practices have undergone over time have proceeded differently than changes to similar practices in Turkey, leading to different results in their current meanings and interpretations. Consequently,
second- and third-generation Norwegian Turks have formed new hybrid cultural patterns, involving
the habits brought by the first generation from Turkey and transformed by influences from
Norwegian society. Since those new values and practices are not specific or common to either
today’s Turkish society nor Norwegian society, the respondents have developed a strong sense of
belonging to the “third space”\footnote{See the discussion on the third cultural space comprising cultural activities linked to \textit{ethnicity} in the first chapter of this book (Cultural traits as defining elements of minority groups by Eduardo J. Ruiz Vieytez). The practices, traditions and systems of values described throughout this paper definitely constitutes “the third cultural space” in Vieytez’s understanding and in line with religion and language, are present in daily practices of my respondents. However, “the third space” that I specify here has a slightly broader meaning, referring to the collective identification with the vague community of Norwegian Turks, which borders are defined by the language, religion and so-called \textit{cultural} practices of people identifying themselves with Turks but living in Norway.}—an informal community of Norwegian Turks within which these hybrid practices and system of values are understood and shared. The third space is physically located in Norway, and this is where the majority of the respondents “feel at home”. The cultural integration to Norwegian society is thus performed under the umbrella of Turkish ethnicity. It proceeds via renegotiations of traditional Turkish heritage in the everyday practices of individuals and legitimization of Norwegian systems of values and traditions through the use of Turkish history. This makes the process of cultural integration of Norwegian Turks into the host society invisible and slow, but present and moving forward. New and hybrid practices have the potential to become a unique heritage of Norwegian Turks, completing the process of cultural integration into Norwegian society within the framework of Turkish ethnicity.

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